Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors

By Eliezer M. Fich, A. Shivdasani. 2006

1,991 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7954e966ade130914320581753ad3d4f10a8b63e

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Citations in the corpus

The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths (2010, background): “Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that independent directors can only be good monitors if they are not “too busy.””
Consensus in Diverse Corporate Boards (2009, neutral): “In this paper, we have also omitted such important issues as directors’ compensationandtheneedforhavingvarioustypesofexpertiseontheboard.While there is little theoretical work on these issues, empirical analysis of some of theseaspectscanbefound,forexample,inAdamsandFerreira(2007);Agrawal and Knoebe”
Board of Directors and Opportunistic Earnings Management: Evidence from India (2008, neutral): “al. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2004; Harris and Shimizu, 2004; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2005).”
Multiple directorships and corporate diversification (2008, neutral): “However, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) question the methodology of Ferris et al.”
Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs (2013, background): “5See Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (2007), and Paul (2007).”
Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation (2011, background): “A high proportion of non-executive directors, separation of the roles of CEO and chairman, and the creation of committees are expected to be important to turn the board into an effective governance device. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) confirm their hypothesis on the negative relation between ”
CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, neutral): “Following Fich and Shivdasani (2006), we use a variable measuring busyness of”
The Impact of Corporate Board Meetings on Corporate Performance in South Africa (2011, positive): “Specifically, past studies have been criticised for heavily relying on ordinary least square regressions (OLS), as well as for not adequately addressing endogeneity problems (Vefeas 1999a; Fich and Shivdasani 2006).”
Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms (2015, background): “…specific characteristics of directors and their strategic choices (Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004; Guner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Hillman, Cannella and Harris, 2002), little is known about corporate decision making as a function of directors’ political…”
Reputation concerns of independent directors: : Evidence from individual director voting (2015, neutral): “One caution to this measure is that too many directorships can be related to leniency by directors (Yermack (2004), Fich and Shivdasani (2006)).”
Financial Expertise of Directors (2008, methodology): “Our analysis complements a growing literature relating board characteristics to firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Perry and Peyer, 2005) and extends the analysis to specific corporate policies.”