Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation

By Joshua Knobe. 2003

420 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e253602aac75edc6a64093698b58bc07169b9201

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Citations in the corpus

Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy (2010, background): “8 Joshua Knobe’s widely read papers in experimental action theory (Knobe 2003a, b) concern, Knobe says, the concept of intentional action.”
Blind forces (2014, neutral): “…fading (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), intuitive morality (Haidt, 2001), plus a host of other cognitive biases (e.g., omission bias [Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006], indirect agency biases [Paharia, Kassam, Greene, & Bazerman, 2009], attribution biases [Knobe, 2003; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003]).”
Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty (2012, background): “These experimental philosophers (often referred to as “x-phi”; e.g., Greene, 2012; Knobe, 2003; see also Knobe & Nichols, 2008) are viewed with great controversy in philosophy since they conduct experiments to learn about what people actually do and say when faced with moral dilemmas.”
Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited (2007, background): “depending on the moral status of the outcome itself ( Knobe 2003a, 2003b, forthcoming ).”
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect (2010, methodology): “Theories that claim that the overall asymmetric pattern of responses to the chairman cases are manifestations of folk conceptual competence (e.g., Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b) typically imply that the responses of those who answer symmetrically should be chalked up to performance error or…”
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility (2005, background): “[3] See, for example, Adams and Steadman (2004), Doris and Stich (forthcoming), Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004), Mele (2003), Nadelhoffer (2004, 2005), Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (forthcoming), Nichols (2004), Nichols, Weinburg, and Stich (2003), Weinburg, Nichols, and Stich (2001),…”
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment (2006, background): “…generalizations will have to be married to Volume 17—Number 12 1087 a more detailed analysis of basic concepts such as action, intention, and contact (Hauser, Cushman, & Young, in press; Hauser, Young, & Cushman, in press; Knobe, 2003; Mikhail, Sorrentino, & Spelke, 2002; Pizarro et al., 2003).”
Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding? (2004, background): “Alternatively, Knobe did not ask the folk whether the actors intended to harm or help the environment (rescue or put in harm’s way the soldiers). It is at least possible that in the minds of the folk, the actors did intend the respective outcomes. In that case, in agreement with Malle & Knobe (1997)”
Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy (2018, background): “…or the content of the stimuli and testing whether this change affects participants’ responses (e.g., changing the side effect of an action from ‘harming the environment’ to ‘helping the environment’ and seeing how this affects participants’ judgments of an agent’s intention, as in Knobe, 2003a).”
Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. (2010, positive): “Participants in the norm-conforming and norm-violating conditions were presented with two short vignettes, the CEO vignette (Knobe, 2003a) from the introduction as well as the analogous DR vignette: DR Vignette: A team of doctors is treating a patient.”
Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. (2008, background): “Adding further complexity the issue of intentionality in moral judgment is a recent and burgeoning literature suggesting that the folk concept of intentionality is dependent upon moral judgments (Knobe, 2003).”
Individual differences, judgment biases, and theory-of-mind: Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry (2009, background): “There is not necessarily any intentional action judgment asymmetry as there may not necessarily or typically be any complete judgment reversal (Knobe, 2003a).”
The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology (2006, background): “…very different cases in which moral considerations appear to influence people's intuitions about whether or not a given behavior is intentional (Harman 1976; Lowe 1978), and when these other kinds of cases have been put to an experimental test, the effect emerges on them as well (Knobe 2003b).”
At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology (2009, background): “Knobe (2003a, 2003b) argued that the very concept of intentionality is imbued with moral meaning—that the use of this concept in judgment depends itself on the moral goodness or badness of a behavior (Knobe and Burra, 2006).5 The empirical evidence for this claim comes from Knobe’s own studies and…”
Folk Intuitions on Free Will (2006, background): “Second, the assumption that one’s own intuitions are typical runs up against the fact that even within cultures there are apparently salient individual differences in intuitions about philosophically important concepts (see the results of Machery et al. 2004 and Knobe 2003a).”
What Dilemma? Moral Evaluation Shapes Factual Belief (2013, positive): “Our findings contribute to a growing body of research demonstrating that moral evaluations affect nonmoral judgments such as assessments of cause (Alicke, 2000; Cushman & Young, 2011), intention (Knobe, 2003, 2010), and control (Young & Phillips, 2011).”