The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology
By Joshua Knobe. 2006
319 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, General Psychology, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5dfd7662c3ff3c7b23b53beee907721977bc7eeb
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Adam Feltz
- Bertram F. Malle
- Joshua Knobe
- Edouard Machery
- Edward T. Cokely
- D. Pettit
- Chris Zarpentine
- Chandra Sekhar Sripada
In General Psychology
- Adam Feltz
- Chandra Sekhar Sripada
- Sara Konrath
- Edward T. Cokely
- Edouard Machery
- Bertram F. Malle
- D. Pettit
- Kristin Smith-Crowe
In Sociology and Political Science
- Jordan R. Axt
- Bertram F. Malle
- Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba
- Adam Feltz
- Andrew E. Monroe
- Edward T. Cokely
- Joshua Knobe
- Edouard Machery
Citations in the corpus
- The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment (2009, background): “Hence, most researchers have concluded that people’s moral judgments are somehow influencing their intuitions as to whether or not an agent acts intentionally (Knobe 2006; Malle 2006; Nadelhoffer 2006; Nado 2008).”
- Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action (2011, methodology): “The key remaining questions are about how this effect is to be understood’ (Knobe, 2006).”
- Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. (2010, unknown): “But recent findings suggest that the reverse may likewise hold – that moral evaluations can influence ascriptions of intentional action (Knobe, 2003a, 2006).”
- Many Labs 2: Investigating Variation in Replicability Across Samples and Settings (2018, background): “Behaviors that are deemed morally wrong may be judged as more intentional than behaviors without moral implications (Knobe, 2006).”
- At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology (2009, background): “More recently, Knobe (2006) has weakened his original claim—arguing that not only moral but also nonmoral evaluations can relax intentionality assessments (Knobe & Mendlow 2004); that there is indeed an intentionality concept both in folk psychology and in moral analysis but that evaluative…”
- No Harm, No Foul: The Outcome Bias in Ethical Judgments (2009, unknown): “ethical problem (e.g., Ferrell et al., 1989, Hunt & Vitelli, 1986; Jones, 1991; Knobe, 2006; Trevino, 1986).”
- The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues (2008, background): “According to Knobe, the folk concept of intentional action plays an important role in blaming and praising ( Knobe, 2006 ).”
- Individual differences, judgment biases, and theory-of-mind: Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry (2009, methodology): “This variation has proven robust and is present in different cultures (Knobe & Burra, 2006), ages (Leslie, et al., 2006), and side effect scenarios (Cushman & Mele, 2008; Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Mele & Cushman, 2007; Nichols & Ulatowski, 2007).”
- 13 Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going (2008, background): “Knobe ( 2006 ) found an asymmetrical effect, such that while only 23% said that the chairman in the first scenario had intentionally helped the environment, in the second scenario, 82% declared that the chairman had intentionally harmed the environment.”
- Do you know more when it matters less? (2010, background): “…been tested empirically by ‘‘experimental philosophers’’ across a wide variety of sub-fields including intentional action (e.g., Cokely & Feltz, 2009; Knobe, 2006), free will and moral responsibility (e.g., Feltz & Cokely, 2009; Feltz, Cokely, & Nadelhoffer, 2009; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, &…”