Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment.

By Fiery Cushman. Cognition, 2008

907 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems and Management, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/46754ed949775d82f58c759bc7f866075ce1b07f

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Citations in the corpus

Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers (2012, background): “Non-philosophers’ moral judgments often accord with moral luck (Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Dreber, Wang and Costa, 2009; Gino, Shu and Bazerman, 2010; Young, Nichols and Saxe, 2010).”
Judging those who judge: Perceivers infer the roles of affect and cognition underpinning others' moral dilemma responses (2017, background): “People appear quite sensitive to psychological factors driving other kinds of moral decisions (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Weiner, 1985).”
An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment (2009, background): “When evaluating the moral status of an action, we consider not only its consequences but also the beliefs and intentions of the agent (Cushman, 2008; Mikhail, 2007; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007; Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006;…”
Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality (2012, background): “manslaughter; American Law Institute, 1962), and folk intuitions correspond to legal distinctions: Intentional transgressions are assigned more blame than accidental transgressions (Cushman, 2008; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, in press; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995).”
Causal-explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. (2010, background): “…finds that agents are typically judged more harshly when they generate negative outcomes intentionally (e.g. murder versus manslaughter, e.g. Cushman, 2008), and more recent work suggests that similar effects may permeate causal judgments (e.g. Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Lagnado & Channon,…”
Innocent intentions: a correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity. (2009, background): “Observers judge intentional harms as worse than accidental harms (e.g., Cushman, 2008).”
When Mental States Matter, When They Don't, and What That Means for Morality (2013, background): “Importantly, empirical work supports a role for intent not only when lives are at stake but also across diverse contexts (Cushman, 2008; Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007).”
Is climate change an ethical issue? Examining young adults’ beliefs about climate and morality (2012, background): “…70,000 premature deaths; World Health Organization 2010), many of the ‘complications’ that have been discussed at length in the (moral philosophical) literature on climate change (e.g., Parfit’s ‘non-identity’ problem and the question of harm to future generations; see Davidson 2008) seem moot.”
Deconstructing intent to reconstruct morality (2015, methodology): “Both of these dimensions are largely absent from judgments of moral wrongness, which instead track whether a person acts under the belief they may be causally responsible for harm, and the degree of harm they believe will occur as a result of their action [2,37,38 ].”
The Pragmatic American: Attributions of Crime and the Hydraulic Relation Hypothesis (2010, background): “Scholars recognize the existence of an inherent ambiguity in making causal inferences (Cushman, 2008; Edwards, 2.”
Moral hindsight for good actions and the effects of imagined alternatives to reality. (2018, background): “But it is a matter of luck whether a car was passing underneath the bridge at the time each one threw a brick (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Young, Nichols, & Saxe, 2010).”
Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm (2017, background): “Jenny welds the metal, but her partner happens to let go and is not burned at all (Cushman, 2008).”
Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions (2013, background): “Decisions about moral blame and permissibility depend on many features of the event, including the agent’s beliefs and desires (14), the severity of the harm (36), the agent’s prior record (37), the means of the harm (38, 39), and the external constraints on the agent [e.”
Mind Attribution is for Morality (2013, background): “Strikingly, vMPFC patients even judged attempted harms as more morally permissible than accidents—a reversal of the normal pattern of moral judgments (Cushman, 2008).”