Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?

By Fred Adams, Annie Steadman. 2004

173 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/55c0cfed1a7cb07b67a4478fa7dadebe0758399a

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In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited (2007, background): “Adams & Steadman suggest that when subjects claim that the CEO intentionally harmed the environment, this does not reflect the 'semantic core' of the concept of intentional action (Adams & Steadman, 2004a).”
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect (2010, background): “In one of the first published critiques of Knobe (2003a), Adams and Steadman (2004a) questioned the limited number of options that subjects were given (only 'intentionally' and 'not intentionally') and hypothesized that if subjects had the option of choosing between 'knowingly' and 'intentionally,'…”
Individual differences, judgment biases, and theory-of-mind: Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry (2009, background): “In this case, a belief-is-sufficient concept may serve a social regulatory function reducing discord by facilitating the assignment of blame for undesirable side effects (Adams & Steadman, 2004).”
The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology (2006, background): “Adams and Steadman (2004b) are not convinced by this response.”
At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology (2009, background): “Importantly, nearly all previous studies have given people only a Yes/ No intentionality question, and people may be reluctant to assert that the harm was entirely unintentional on the CEO’s part (Adams and Steadman, 2004).”
Intention, intentional action and moral considerations (2004, background): “Adams and Steadman (2004) make a number of important criticisms of my work on the concept of intentional action.”
The folk concepts of intention and intentional action: A cross-cultural study (2006, background): “So, for example, Adams and Steadman (2004a, 2004b) have argued the effect described above is due entirely to conversational pragmatics.”
Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. (2010, background): “For example, conversational pragmatics (Adams & Steadman, 2004), the desire to blame an agent for a negative outcome (Malle & Nelson, 2003; Mele, 2001), or an emotional reaction (Nadelhoffer, 2004) could lead participants to (mistakenly) describe the side effect as having been brought about…”
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility (2005, background): “[3] See, for example, Adams and Steadman (2004), Doris and Stich (forthcoming), Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004), Mele (2003), Nadelhoffer (2004, 2005), Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (forthcoming), Nichols (2004), Nichols, Weinburg, and Stich (2003), Weinburg, Nichols, and Stich (2001),…”
Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies (2005, background): “Accordingly, more respondents will answer ‘‘yes’’ on the matter of intending/intention if only asked to pronounce on that issue (cf. Adams & Steadman, 2004a, p. 177).”