Price versus Non‐Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts

By John E. Core, W. Guay, Robert E. Verrecchia. 2003

323 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/deb6292a2c67fb4a05f062ef2eb91cb962a1d1ca

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Citations in the corpus

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs (2011, background): “In general, the coefficients on standardized measures are smaller in magnitude than coefficients on the performance measures found elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Core et al. (2003)), but because these measures are standardized, a direct magnitude comparison is not appropriate for a few reasons.”
Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation (2009, unknown): “[21] Core, J.”
The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, unknown): “In reality, the bulk of a CEO s incentives stems from previously granted stock and options (see, e.g., Hall and Liebman 1998; Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003).”
Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? (2010, unknown): “In spite of the concerns that the votes will interfere, Davis (2007) reports increased accountability and communication between the board and shareholder when required shareholder votes are implemented internationally.”
Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation (2012, unknown): “, Lambert and Larcker [1987], Sloan [1993], Core et al.[2003]) show that accounting earnings provide useful information about managerial effort, and therefore, can be used to improve efficiency in executive compensation contracts.”
The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “…body of empirical research makes it clear that accounting-based performance measures are not the most important source of executive incentives (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Core, Guay, and Verrecchia, 2003), accounting information can still play a role in filtering noise from stock price performance.”
Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation (2006, unknown): “Empirical evidence indicates that stock returns are noisier (have higher variance) and receive higher weight in compensation contracts than accounting returns ( Core et al., 2003 ).”
Performance, Growth and Earnings Management (2006, background): “Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003) also document the same trend.”