Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?
By Jie Cai, R. Walkling. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2010
308 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3adc2924b7d07e4f1cac4653e3ee3a8b9d522d33
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- Pratima Bansal
- Caroline Flammer
- David F. Larcker
- Gaizka Ormazabal
- David Yermack
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Ian D. Gow
- Alex Edmans
In Management Information Systems
- David Yermack
- David F. Larcker
- Pratima Bansal
- Thomas Philippon
- Paul P. Momtaz
- Christopher D. Ittner
- Jean-François Henri
- John E. Core
Citations in the corpus
- Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “abnormal CEO pay and low wealth-performance sensitivity (Cai and Walkling, 2011).”
- Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, methodology): “Cai & Walkling (2009) conduct an event study of the reaction of U.S. firms’ stock prices to the approval of say-on-pay by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2007.”
- Does a Long-Term Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity (2017, background): “Indeed, a well-established institutional feature of shareholder activism is that activists target primarily large companies (e.g., Cai and Walkling, 2011; Cuñat et al., 2012, 2015; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; Smith, 1996).”
- Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, unknown): “In contrast, Cai and Walkling (2011) show that when the House passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, the market reaction was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal CEO compensation and low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and for those responsive to shareholder pressure.”
- The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation (2010, unknown): “Cai and Walkling (2009) examine shareholder returns to the passage of the Say on Pay Bill of 2007 by the US House of Representatives (April 20, 2007).”
- Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Valuation around the World (2013, unknown): “, Coates (2009), Bebchuk, Friedman, and Friedman (2007), Davis (2007), Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2005)).”
- Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research (2017, unknown): “…filings, NBER Patent Database HFA Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen, and Yang (2012) 2000-2006 IRRC, DEFC and DEFN filings (US); ISS, Factiva (UK) SP, Proxy Cai and Walkling (2011) 2006-2008 ISS, IRRC SP Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) 1992-1996 Internal data from CREF, IRRC, CDA/Spectrum NS CREF…”
- Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms (2015, background): “Carter and Zamora (2009) and Alissa (2009) find that negative votes are associated with measures of excess compensation, and that boards respond to negative votes by reducing excess salary levels and by forcing out highly paid CEOs.”
- The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans (2012, unknown): “Cai and Walkling (2009) study the passage of the Say-on-Pay Bill—from which the Dodd-Frank Act derives—by the US House of Representatives.”