The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting

By Christopher S. Armstrong, W. Guay, Joseph P. Weber. 2010

1,417 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/72ba03c5decb455bb1b66b93a6bb64386417b8af

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Guiding Through the Fog: Financial Statement Complexity and Voluntary Disclosure (2016, positive): “On the one hand, managers under a high degree of scrutiny from external monitors may have stronger incentives to mitigate the negative informational effects of complex financial statements and maintain the quality of the information environment (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Armstrong et al., 2010).”
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review (2019, background): “, 2010) and/or improves contracting efficiency (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001; Armstrong et al., 2010).”
Does Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards Reduce Information Asymmetry in Equity Markets? * (2017, background): “…independent boards take actions to promote orporate transparency and to curb managers from adoptng opportunistic/self-serving behaviours, such as earnings anagement, thereby improving the quality of financial eporting (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ajinkya et al., 005; Armstrong et al., 2010).”
Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction: Evidence from Small Business Debt (2015, background): “In addition to using alternative information sources to address information asymmetry problems, lenders can adjust contractual characteristics (Armstrong et al., 2010).”
Is Environmental Governance Substantive or Symbolic? An Empirical Investigation (2012, background): “…three environmental governance mechanisms that emanate from the board and reﬂect its dual monitoring and advice functions (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Armstrong et al. 2010): the existence of an environmental committee, the proportion of environmentally aware directors on the board, and the presence…”
Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance (2015, background): “Consistent with this notion, there is empirical evidence that tax avoidance is associated with greater levels of incentive compensation (e.g., Phillips, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2011; Rego and Wilson, 2012).”
Internal Controls and Conditional Conservatism (2011, background): “variables that can be used for contracting purposes (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Bushman and Smith 2001; Armstrong et al. 2010).”
The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting Irregularities (2012, positive): “Armstrong et al. (2010) argue that “active” investors with large equity positions and the ability to influence a firm’s strategic direction require reliable and timely information from the firm in order to monitor managers’ actions.”
Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (2010, background): “However, as is also discussed by Armstrong et al. (2010), future research might benefit from work that examines a fuller version of the agency problems between boards, managers, stockholders, as well as between different groups of stockholders (e.”
Information Environment and the Investment Decisions of Multinational Corporations (2013, background): “Similarly, Bushman and Smith (2001) and Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss several cases in which external information is used to facilitate internal governance mechanisms that 1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms “MNCs” and “parents” interchangeably.”