Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs

By Adair Morse, Vikram K. Nanda, Amit Seru. 2011

397 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/51610f7b87b11a47a43cd6e43601008d29dcfbbc

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Yaniv Grinstein
2. Michael S. Weisbach
3. David De Angelis
4. T. Y. Wang
5. Yihui Pan
6. Christian Leuz
7. John R. Graham
8. Luc Renneboog

In Finance

1. Yaniv Grinstein
2. Michael S. Weisbach
3. David De Angelis
4. Luc Renneboog
5. Roni Michaely

In Strategy and Management

1. Yaniv Grinstein
2. Michael S. Weisbach
3. David De Angelis
4. Murillo Campello
5. V. Dang

Citations in the corpus

• Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (2015, positive): “…acknowledge that it is possible that firms have manipulated the disclosure of the terms used here.30 It is also possible that firms rig performance measures after the fact (Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 2011), and the disclosed measures are simply an ad hoc justification for high compensation to the CEO.”
• Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, neutral): “2 For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Bebchuk and Fried (2004), and Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) argue that CEO entrenchment and ineffective board monitoring are the causes of increased CEO pay.”
• CEO Investment cycles (2016, background): “11 Morse et al. (2011) and Coles et al. (2014) document that board cooption is associated with a higher level of managerial pay, but less incentives provided to managers, and a lower level of turnover-performance sensitivity.”
• Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance (2011, neutral): “Finally, Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) report that powerful CEOs “rig” the incentive part of their compensation.”
• Co-opted Boards (2014, neutral): “…directors Board size This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater co-option.8 8 In contemporaneous work independent of ours, Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) develop a measure of CEO power based on three elements, one of which is similar to our measure of co-option.”