VERTICAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH DUOPOLY RETAILERS

By Hongtao Zhang. 2002

310 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dc7d6da6f11e1424335df5cc2717312ed6a2f448

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In Management Information Systems

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Marketing

Citations in the corpus

Supplier Encroachment as an Enhancement or a Hindrance to Nonlinear Pricing (2015, background): “For instance, Li (2002) and Zhang (2002) investigate information sharing in a setting where a central supplier sells to multiple competing resellers that have better demand information, while Ha and Tong (2008) and Ha et al. (2011) focus on a setting with two competing supply chains and explore the…”
Information sharing in supply chains: Incentives for information distortion (2007, result): “Similar results were also shown by Zhang (2002) .”
Information Sharing in an Online Marketplace with Co‐opetitive Sellers (2020, background): “Zhang (2002) extends the framework to both Cournot and Bertrand competition and shows that the manufacturer can induce downstream information sharing by offering a subsidy.”
Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric Information (2014, background): “This finding has also been established in the literature (Li and Zhang 2002).”
Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition (2008, background): “Another stream of research more relevant to our work studies the incentive for firms in a supply chain to share information (Li 2002; Zhang 2002; Li and Zhang 2002, 2008).1 Most of the work here assumes linear price contracts offered by a single manufacturer and considers imperfect demand signal.”
Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer (2013, background): “The focus of this stream of work is on the incentive for the retailers to share demand information with the manufacturer (Li 2002, Li and Zhang 2002, Zhang 2002) and how that incentive depends on confidentiality (Li and Zhang 2008) and the product wholesale contracts (Shin and Tunca 2010, Tang and…”
Happy together?. Insights and implications of viewing managed supply chains as a social dilemma (2007, background): “A third type of defection that might occur in supply chain alliances is called ‘‘leakage’’ (e.g., Zhang, 2002).”
Information sharing and supply chain performance: the role of connectivity and willingness (2007, background): “Many managers define and manage information sharing as a technology issue (Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Chatfield et al., 2004; Constant et al., 1994; Fiala, 2005; Frohlich, 2002; Hongtao, 2002; Lee et al., 2000; Robinson et al., 2005; Strader and Lin, 1999).”
Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain (2009, methodology): “Zhang (2002) extends Li (2002)’s model to partial substitutes and complements, with both Bertrand and Cournot competition.”
Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains (2009, methodology): “Zhang (2002) considered a model in which each retailer sold a different product developed from the same base product supplied by the manufacturer.”
Retailer Information Sharing with Supplier Encroachment (2018, background): “Incomplicated supply chain structures, Li (2002) and Zhang (2002) investigate information sharing in a setting in which a single supplier sells to multiple competing retailers that have better demand information.”