Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer
By Weixin Shang, Albert Y. Ha, Shilu Tong. Management Sciences, 2013
412 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/878bde372c2e366df075eb3772a62e34d7f6d042
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Information Systems
In Management Science and Operations Research
In Marketing
Citations in the corpus
- Retailer Information Sharing with Supplier Encroachment (2018, result): “Our study belongs to the vast literature on information sharing in supply chains (see, e.g., Aviv 2001, Cachon and Fisher 2000, Guo 2009, Jiang et al. 2016, Kong et al. 2013, Li and Zhang 2008, Shamir and Shin 2016, Shang et al. 2016).”
- Platform Information Transparency and Effects on Third‐Party Suppliers and Offline Retailers (2021, background): “Following Raju et al. (1995), Li and Zhang (2008), and Shang et al. (2016), demand in the retail market is captured through the following demand functions: In the demand functions, α represents a common market potential for the product of the supplier, which is assumed to be uncertain and…”
- Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction (2017, background): “With nonlinear production cost, Ha et al. (2011) and Shang et al. (2016) show that information sharing can benefit the supply chain due to the order uncertainty effect when production cost is highly nonlinear.”
- Information Sharing in an Online Marketplace with Co‐opetitive Sellers (2020, background): “For example, Shang et al. (2016) examine a retailer’s information-sharing strategy with two competing manufacturers.”
- Production Coopetition Strategies for Competing Manufacturers that Produce Partially Substitutable Products (2019, neutral): “9 m Manufacturer’s unit production cost q1, q2 Demand for manufacturers 1 and 2 r Manufacturer 1’s royalty fee for the component, where 0 < r < ∆c M Manufacturer 1’s fixed license fee for the component, M > 0 p1, p2 Unit retail price for manufacturers 1 and 2 w Manufacturer 1’s unit component wholes”