The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment

By John H. Kagel, Alvin E. Roth. 2000

246 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d4e0aec8ab05317a5f86ed8690cdf00e8c0b51db

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In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access (2006, unknown): “In the laboratory, a deferred acceptance mechanism increases the efficiency of allocation over time (Kagel and Roth 1999), and this seems to have occured in the implementation of the New York City high school match, when we compare the second year of operation with the first (Abdulkadiro˘ glu,…”
School choice: an experimental study (2006, unknown): “As Roth emphasizes [35], experimental economics is one of the basic tools of market design.”
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002, background): “contrast, the auctions were severely criticized by economists for their design on the grounds that new entrants would be deterred: see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Klemperer (2000). However these auctions raised even more revenue than the English auctions. See Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter (2001)”
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, unknown): “Field and laboratory evidence suggests that stability is responsible for the persistence of certain centralized clearinghouses (Roth 1991; Kagel and Roth 2000).”
Core-selecting package auctions (2008, background): “Evidence suggesting that stable matching mechanisms remain in use long after unstable mechanisms have been abandoned is found both in empirical studies (Roth and Xing 1994) and in laboratory experiments ( Kagel and Roth 2000 ).”
Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study (2002, background): “While we are not aware of any systematic field studies of this mechanism, there is some evidence for this inefficiency.”
Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India (2019, unknown): “In fact, stability has been found to be essential to the success of such clearinghouses (Kagel and Roth 2000).”
Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments (2004, unknown): “He is able to corroborate other findings of two-sided matching experiments conducted by Kagel and Roth (2000) and Ünver (2001b) that explore the unraveling in the British medical intern markets. Haruvy et al. (2002) conduct a parallel experiment with human subjects and with artificial agents modeled”
An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2003, unknown): “…earlier rather than later, and experiments have been conducted to better understand these incentives to transact early (see Haruvy et al., 2001, and Kagel and Roth, 2000, which are motivated by studies of timing in entry level labor markets, cf. Roth and Xing, 1994, and Avery et al. 2001).”