Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study

By Yan Chen, Tayfun Sönmez. 2002

154 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c4783988619d24915058826d62cb625ffe351c7c

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In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints (2018, unknown): “2019), on-campus housing, and office allocation (Chen and Snmez 2002).”
School choice: an experimental study (2006, unknown): “In a recent paper, Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Sönmez formulate school choice as a mechanism design problem [2].”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “Chen and Sönmez (2002) showed through a laboratory experiment that this mechanism is practically better than the RSD mechanism with squatting rights.”
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2010, background): “5 See Sönmez and Ünver (2011) for a survey treatment and Chen and Sönmez (2002), Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2005), and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) on applications to housing markets and school choice.”
Tradable Immigration Quotas (2014, unknown): “So far, this is a direct application of Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999) following directly the exposition in Chen and Sonmez (2002) and substituting word by word house for visa and refugee for tenant.”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, methodology): “Example applications include campus housing allocation [142, 474], DVD rental markets [19] and assigning reviewers to conference papers [242].”
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013, background): “The mechanism then computes a competitive equilibrium of this market, where the objects being priced and allocated are probability shares of objects.”
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008, background): “…existing tenants in house allocation (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 1999) and non-strict priorities by schools 1See Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Chen and Sönmez (2002) for application to house allocation, and Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003b) for student…”