School choice: an experimental study

By Yan Chen, Tayfun Sönmez. Journal of Economics Theory, 2006

423 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/15aff1ce6cbd3755a8207a27549ca14c1b9741a1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis (2017, methodology): “Similarly, the analysis of the Boston and NYC school district data by Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth and Sönmez (2006) and Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and Roth (2009) also reports the number of first choices of students.”
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (2008, methodology): “Unlike earlier computational simulations in the literature such as Yan Chen and Sönmez (2006) with 36 students and 7 schools, and Kesten (2005) with 20 students and 2 schools, we conducted experiments with relatively large sets of schools and students.”
Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019, background): “For example, Chen and Sönmez (2006) call a student truth-telling under the DA mechanism if she ranks her most-preferred schools up to her district school, at which she has guaranteed admission.”
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access (2006, positive): “Among experimental subjects, both rules-of-thumb are fairly common (Chen and Sönmez 2006).”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, background): “Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) pointed out that the Boston mechanism is flawed in many ways (also see Chen and Sönmez, 2006; Ergin and Sönmez, 2006; Pais and Pinter, 2007; Pathak and Sönmez, 2008).”
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783. (2011, neutral): “, b k i ) ∈ R+, and the k units are awarded to the bidders with the k highest reported valuations.(17) The utility of bidder i who wins ` objects at a total cost of c is:”
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017, neutral): “52McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) 53Such behavior has been found in the laboratory (Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Chen and Sönmez, 2006; Zhang and Levin, 2017), and in high-stakes decisions in the field (Hassidim et al., 2016; Rees-Jones, 2017).”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, neutral): “Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (2007) supported the Haeringer and Klijn (2007) theoretical study on constrained school choice with laboratory experiments and complemented the Chen and Sönmez (2006) experimental study on unconstrained school choice.”
Constrained school choice (2009, neutral): “The claim yields a contradiction to (10).”