A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution

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Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008, background): “…existing tenants in house allocation (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 1999) and non-strict priorities by schools 1See Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Chen and Sönmez (2002) for application to house allocation, and Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003b) for student…”
Pairwise kidney exchange (2005, unknown): “By Lemma 2.1 in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002), for each pre-allocation there is a pre-lottery that induces it.”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “In fact, a mechanism is ordinally effi cient if and only if its outcome can be found through an eating algorithm.1 1Crés and Moulin (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002) introduced a strategy-proof and ordinally effi cient lottery mechanism in a preference domain where relative preferences of…”
When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient (2012, background): “…(1973), Satterthwaite (1975), Moulin (1980), Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), Saporiti (2009)), matching (Roth (1982), Alcalde and Barberà (1994), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)), queueing (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002)), and rationing (Sprumont (1991), Ehlers and Klaus (2003)), among others.”