Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship

By Mihai Manea. 2009

87 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6c1bbaef7740cd4e3498828f1033bf47fec7f30b

Citations in the corpus

• Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “Katta and Sethuraman (2006) generalized the PS mechanism when indifferences are allowed in 2See Manea (2006) and Che and Kojima (2008) about results on asymptotic ordinal ineffi ciency and effi ciency of RSD in different large economies, respectively.”
• Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, unknown): “Large market arguments have been used in a number of other recent studies of matching mechanisms (Bulow and Levin 2006; Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda 2008; Manea 2009; Che and Kojima 2010; Kojima and Manea 2010; Budish 2011; Liu and Pycia 2011; Azevedo and Leshno 2012; Lee 2013).”
• A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “In the market design literature, many recent papers have focused on large markets (Kojima and Manea 2009; Manea 2009; Budish and Cantillon Forthcoming; Budish Forthcoming; Che and Kojima 2010; Azevedo and Budish 2011; Liu and Pycia 2011a).”