On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards

By Erik Lie. Management Sciences, 2005

492 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d19aafdb95f314cddd98e4c01c2795f7fbd681f2

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Citations in the corpus

Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making? (2017, background): “We also include option backdating as another instance of managerial behavior with potentially important economic ramifications (Yermack (1997), Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2007), and Narayanan and Seyhun (2008)).”
Do Short Sellers Front-Run Insider Sales? (2013, unknown): “Front-running is frequently alleged in practitioner circles and was widely believed to have occurred around the Long-Term Capital Management debacle of 1998. The empirical literature on front-running is relatively small, likely due to the difficulty of directly testing for front-running, and the abs”
SEC Comment Letters and Insider Sales (2016, unknown): “To control for the expected level of insider sales, we use a methodology similar to Lie (2005), and take five observations of the same firm with a disclosure date randomly chosen from between six and three months prior to the comment letter disclosure date and between three and six months after the…”
Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123-R* (2009, unknown): “Similar to the return patterns documented by Lie (2005), we find systematic negative stock returns of –1.7% 20 days before the acceleration date (not the announcement date) and positive returns of 1.4% 20 days after the acceleration date.”
Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct (2010, background): “Alternatively, they may just postdate the option to a day when there was a dip in the firm’s stock value (Lie, 2005).”
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs (2011, background): “Lie (2005), Lie and Randall (2007), Narayanan and Seyhun (2006) and Yermack (1997) find, for instance, that executive options are often backdated to hide direct cash giveaways to CEOs and senior management.”
Accounting Informs Investors and Earnings Management is Rife: Two Questionable Beliefs (2013, unknown): “5 Lie (2005) documented an unusually large number of stock option grants to executives after declines and right before increases in their stock prices.”
Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (2015, unknown): “30 For example, Lie (2005) has shown that firms falsified the grant dates of options grants in the backdating scandal.”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “…found that after the Securities and Exchange Commission 2-business-day reporting rule for option grants became effective (August 29, 2002), the return pattern Lie (2005) demonstrated became significantly weaker overall and completely disappeared for grants reported within 1 day of their grant date.”
Performance-Induced CEO Turnover (2020, unknown): “Many CEO departures are forced without being performance induced – e.g., CEOs are fired for backdating options (Lie (2005)).”
The danger of misinterpreting short-window event study findings in strategic management research: an empirical illustration using horizontal acquisitions (2008, background): “Pangarkar and Acquisitions in Singapore 9 to 1 Lie (2004)”