Principal-principal conflicts during crisis
By Yi Jiang, Mike W. Peng. 2011
165 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d0dedc4b12aaf2631f3a0e26258671e17c472868
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Mike W. Peng
- Igor Filatotchev
- Mike Wright
- Yi Jiang
- Marc van Essen
- Garry D. Bruton
- M. Carney
- R. Hoskisson
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Mike W. Peng
- Marc van Essen
- Yi Jiang
- Igor Filatotchev
- Mike Wright
- M. Carney
- R. Hoskisson
- A. Solarino
Citations in the corpus
- Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, background): “In the eight Asian countries that we sample, while some of the family firms with family CEOs or pyramid structures indeed suffer from poor performance, many others benefit from the affiliation with family control, and still others manage to have their performance unaffected.”
- Does family business excel in firm performance? An institution-based view (2012, background): “Notwithstanding the potential impact of the institutional environment on firm practices and performance, it is surprising to see how little research has paid attention to the institutional impact on family business (see Burkart et al., 2003; Jiang & Peng, 2010 ; P eng J Peng & Jiang, 2010; Young e”
- Emerging multinationals from mid-range economies: the influence of institutions and factor markets (2013, background): “A substantial body of research has focused on the governance roles of dominant blockholders, especially in the environment of emerging and less developed economies (Claessens et al., 2000; Jiang and Peng, 2011a, 2011b).”
- The Resilient Family Firm: Stakeholder Outcomes and Institutional Effects (2015, background): “…view suggests that concentrated owners have increased motivation to misappropriate minority investors and protect their own interests in times of crisis by “tunneling” resources out of the firm (Baek, Kang, & Park, 2005; Jiang & Peng, 2011; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; Mitton, 2002).”
- Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese private SMEs (2012, unknown): “Bruton, & Jiang, 2008; Jiang & Peng, 2011b; Wu, Xu, & Phan, 2011).”
- Ownership of Corporations (2016, background): “…Driffield, & Pal, 2010; Brauer & Wiersema, 2012) because such interference in firm affairs may be considered illegitimate, or they can conceal their actions (Oliver, 1991) and engage in extraction of private benefits of control (e.g., Filatotchev, Zhang, & Piesse, 2011; Jiang & Peng, 2011b).”
- Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy? (2011, unknown): “…Shleifer, 2000), expropriation against minority owner (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001), entrenchment (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002), private benefits of control (Denis & McConnell, 2003), or more recently principal-principal conflicts (Jiang & Peng, 2010; Su et al., 2007; Young et al., 2008).”
- Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “The results render some strong support for the conclusions drawn by Bennedsen and Wolfenzen (2000); Gomes and Novaes (2005); Jiang and Peng (2011); Maury and Pajuste (2005; Gutierrez and Pombo (2009) who note that multiple large shareholder structure has become an important and viable means to…”
- Theories of the (state-owned) firm (2016, background): “One additional blockholder can provide some checks and balances, and multiple blockholders may form a coalition to take action against the controlling shareholder, thus providing some internal safeguards to curb principal-principal conflicts (Jiang & Peng, 2011).”
- State ownership reinvented? Explaining performance differences between state‐owned and private firms (2018, unknown): “The principal-principal (PP) problem, in turn, is related to the discretionary relation between SOEs and governments that have distinct influence in strategic decisions even at the expense of other owners (D'Souza & Nash, 2017; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Y. Jiang & Peng, 2011; Young et al., 2008).”