The impact of reputation and variance investigations on the creation of budget slack

By R. Webb, CARLA A. Carnaghan, M. Gibbins, Richard Johnson, M. Lipe, Steven E. Salterio, A. Schulz, Tom Scott, Michael D. Shields, Peter. 2002

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Intellectual capital, management accounting practices and corporate performance : perceptions of managers (2007, background): “Accounting-based budgetary controls are an integral part of the management control system in organisations (Webb, 2002; Van der Stede, 2001; Armstrong et al., 1996).”
Fifty-Year Overview of Judgment and Decision-Making Research in Accounting (2011, unknown): “Webb (2002) found that reputation concerns and the existence of a variance investigation policy both led to lower budget slack, leading him to suggest that social concerns could also serve as a means of reducing extensive incentive contracting in practice.”
An exploratory study on the emergence of management control systems: formalizing human resources in small growing firms (2005, background): “experiment-based research designs (Fisher, Maines, Peffer, & Sprinkle, 2002; Webb, 2002).”
Why business unit controllers create budget sack: Involvement in management, social pressure, and machiavellianism (2010, background): “A common concern in budgeting is that BU managers have incentives to create budget slack to maximize the expected value of the pay-offs from budget target achievement (Webb 2002; Nouri and Parker 1996), while it is in corporate managers’ and owners’ interest that budget proposals reflect the units’ ”