Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

By Bruce Shearer. 2004

467 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bd009d00398d26d6517bf0ef8b14ffc7ec4ed325

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Citations in the corpus

Lab Labor: What can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? (2010, unknown): “12 Holt (2007) points out that field experiments are particularly valuable when social context is critically important.”
Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation? (2009, background): “In this case, optimal incentive plans are often based on the pay-for-performance principle, which prescribes high rewards after good performance and low rewards or termination after poor performance.”
Social comparison and effort provision: evidence from a field experiment (2014, background): “This is important because many eld experiments report substantial heterogeneity in unobserved worker characteristics and emphasize the importance of controlling for it (Shearer 2004; Fehr and Goette 2007).”
Pay for Performance in the Public Sector—Benefits and (Hidden) Costs (2010, unknown): “…and/or interesting) Outcome Measurement (1 5 quality, 2 5 quantity) 33 Scott, Farh, and Podsakoff (1988) 1 48 48 2.69 *** 0.28 9.56 2 2 2 34 Shearer (2004) 1 9 9 0.85 * 0.49 1.73 1 1 2 35 Stajkovic and Luthans (2001) 2 23.5 23 0.50 ** 0.21 2.39 2 1 1 and 2 36 Stone and Ziebart (1995) 1 42…”
Human Resource Management and Productivity (2010, background): “Shearer (2004) addresses this problem in his study of tree planters in British Columbia.”
Organizational and human resource management and innovation: Which management practices are linked to product and/or process innovation? (2018, result): “While some show that compensation based on the pay-for-performance principle induces higher levels of effort and productivity (e.g., Lazear, 2000; Shearer, 2004), other studies highlight the distortions associated with incentive pay schemes (e.”
Performance Pay, Risk Attitudes and Job Satisfaction (2008, unknown): “Performance pay has been shown to increase worker effort, earnings and risk (Booth and Frank, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Lemieux et al., 2009; Oettinger, 2001; Paarsch and Shearer, 2000; Parent, 1999; Shearer, 2004).”
Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, background): “2 Consistent with this view and with our modeling premise that performance incentives affect not only moral hazard ðe.g., Shearer 2004; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2007Þ but also selection, Lazear’s ð2000Þ study of Safelite Glass Company found that half of the 44 percent productivity increase…”
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students (2004, unknown): “An Experiment with Managers and Students Claude Montmarquette, Jean-Louis Rullière, Marie Claire Villeval, Romain Zeiliger”
Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work (2002, unknown): “Interestingly enough, these non-experimental ndings are fully compatible with the experimental results in Shearer (1999)17.”
The Employment Relationship and Inequality: How and Why Changes in Employment Practices are Reshaping Rewards in Organizations (2013, background): “Case studies show how the implementation of performance pay leads to a much tighter link between productivity assessments and pay (Lazear, 2000; Shearer, 2004).”