Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
By L. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, David I. Walker. 2002
1,640 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b60e44889d86c25d44a4f504fb661f84ab5d0995
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Yaniv Grinstein
- Kevin J. Murphy
- L. Bebchuk
- Luis R. Gómez-Mejía
- M. Conyon
- Paul Hribar
- Dylan B. Minor
- Jesse M. Fried
Citations in the corpus
- Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance (2009, positive): “For example, top executives in corporate firms can influence the pay-setting process (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002)) and can issue stocks and options before the release of good news (Yermack (1997)).”
- Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003, positive): “We seek to develop a full account of how managerial influence shapes the executive compensation landscape in a forthcoming book (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)) that builds substantially on a long article written jointly with David Walker (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002)).”
- CEO Compensation and Company Performance (2011, neutral): “Because of this, executives can be overpaid and be protected from poor performance and, thereby, diminish the relationship between executive pay and the performance of the firm [10-12].”
- Is there a gender gap in CEO compensation (2012, positive): “It is expected that CEOs receive higher compensation when they also act as the board chairperson due to their greater influence over the board (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).”
- The One Percent (2014, positive): “The board can construct a compensation package that aligns CEO and shareholder interests, but current speculation among financial economists proposes that in reality CEOs use compensation to manipulate boards and drive up their own incomes (Bebchuk et al. 2002, Bebchuk & Grinstein 2005).”
- CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses (2004, positive): “Jensen (1993), Bebchuk et al. (2002), and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that CEOs control the information that the board has about the company because they determine the board meeting agenda and the information given to the board, especially if they are the chairmen of their own boards.”