Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

By Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel, Narayan Naik. 2009

620 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/abac2cedadb141209f8d19bf910905b21f7ccde5

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Citations in the corpus

The performance of emerging hedge funds and managers. (2010, background): “In the hedge fund industry, Agarwal et al. (2007) find that greater”
Tail Risk in Hedge Funds: A Unique View from Portfolio Holdings (2017, background): “Although surprising at first sight, this result is consistent with Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) who find that incentive fee does not capture managerial incentives as two managers charging the same incentive fee can face different dollar incentives depending on the timing and magnitude of…”
The Road Less Traveled: Strategy Distinctiveness and Hedge Fund Performance (2012, background): “Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) show that funds that offer their managers greater incentives and discretion in trading display superior performance.”
Higher Risk, Lower Returns: What Hedge Fund Investors Really Earn (2011, positive): “The percentage of overlap in the two databases is consistent with findings from prior literature (Agarwal et al. 2009; Fung et al. 2008); however, the number of funds included in this study is greater due to the extended sample period.”
On the High Frequency Dynamics of Hedge Fund Risk Exposures (2013, positive): “A partial list includes Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2004a,b), Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang (1999), Agarwal and Naik (2004), Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2006), Agarwal et al. (2009), Chen and Liang (2007), Fung et al. (2008), Patton (2009), and Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010).”
Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the Pooled Distribution (2009, positive): “We test this conjecture by regressing annual investor capital flow on lagged annual returns and the number of months in the prior year with positive returns, as in Agarwal et al. (2007a).”
Portfolio Manager Ownership and Fund Performance (2007, positive): “For hedge funds, Brown et al. (1999) do not find a relationship between fees and performance, while Agarwal et al. (2005) do find that incentives and performance are related.”