A Theory of Friendly Boards

By Renée B. Adams, Daniel Ferreira. 2007

2,291 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b3474de7055247bcfdb05e0d95697a362807a921

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mergers (2018, neutral): “8 For example, in Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Fama and Jensen (1983) and many others.”
Endogenously Structured Boards of Directors in Banks (2010, background): “To answer this question, several studies attempt to explain this observation by relating the costs and benefits associated with boards’ monitoring and advising functions (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Raheja 2005; Adams and Ferreira 2007; and Harris and Raviv 2008).”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, positive): “Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) both argue that the effectiveness of directors as advisors and monitors depends on their ability to obtain and process information about the firm and its internal/external environments.”
Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors (2010, neutral): “Adams and Ferreira (2007) emphasize the importance of the advisory role of the board of directors.”
It Pays to Have Friends (2009, positive): “Studies focusing on the advisory role of the board argue the merits of a friendlier board (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; and Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008), but insofar as its disciplinary or supervisory role is concerned, the board is more effective as an independent…”
The costs of intense board monitoring (2011, positive): “Similarly, Adams and Ferreira (2007) propose a model in which the CEO does not communicate with a board that monitors too much, while Adams (2009) presents survey evidence suggesting that independent directors receive less strategic information from management when they monitor intensely.”
Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, background): “Alternatively, managers might strategically limit direcors’ access to firm-specific information to lessen their monitoring apabilities, although doing so would also reduce the benefits obained from directors’ advice ( Adams and Ferreira, 2007 ).”
Innovation and Institutional Ownership (2013, positive): “For example, boards composed mostly of outsiders can jeopardize the ability of the board to separate luck from skill in CEO performance, increasing her risk aversion and jeopardizing innovation ( Adams and Ferreira 2007 .”
Consensus in Diverse Corporate Boards (2009, neutral): “While there is little theoretical work on these issues, empirical analysis of some of these aspects can be found, for example, in Adams and Ferreira (2007); Agrawal and Knoeber (2001); and Fich and Shivdasani (2006), and it would be nice to have a better theoretical understanding as well.”
The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Financial Performance (2008, methodology): “Adams and Ferreira (2006) analyze the board’s dual role as advisor and monitor of management.”