Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors

By Ruediger Fahlenbrach, A. Low, René M. Stulz. 2010

381 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/16762f1341717b28a62913574add9f78523b3152

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Citations in the corpus

Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, background): “…studies present results consistent with the notion that firm size is a proxy for reputation incentives and that independent directors allocate more effort to larger firms (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis, 2013; Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2008).”
Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, background): “The second is geographic distance between an outside director’s home and a firm’s headquarters, used by Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) to instrument for whether the outside director is a CEO of another company.”
Outside Directors on the Board and Innovative Firm Performance (2014, neutral): “Fahlenbrach et al. (2010b) support this view in an supplementary study by showing that outside directors are likely to leave the board prior to a decline in performance or shareholder lawsuits.”
Globalizing the Boardroom - The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2012, background): “The effect 22 Our board meeting attendance evidence can help explain why Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2009) find little effect of CEO-directors on firm performance, decision making, and governance.”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, positive): “Consistent with this, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find that outside CEOs are more likely to join boards with other outside CEOs while Faleye et al. (2015) show that the likelihood of an entrepreneur director joining a board increases with the number of other entrepreneurs currently on that board.”
The role of investment banker directors in M&A (2014, background): “Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) show that CEO directors have no impact on firms' acquisition performance.”
Director skill sets (2018, positive): “Similarly, Fich (2005) finds that shareholders seem to value CEO experience of directors, while Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) find that CEO experience does not add additional value.”
Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management: The Role of Status (2014, background): “director and executive status is positively correlated at the firm level and that accountants lower the status of audit committees (e.g., Erkens and Bonner, 2013; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010).”