It Pays to Have Friends
By Byoung-Hyoun Hwang, Seoyoung Kim. 2009
857 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0ca7483d4e5d332ba92a52ae1b4af75dab108bfa
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Jens Hagendorff
- David F. Larcker
- Ronald W. Masulis
- Angelica Gonzalez
- Vathunyoo Sila
- L. Naveen
- Cesare Fracassi
- Eric C. So
In Safety Research
- S. W. Reza
- W. Wan-Hussin
- Mohamad Naimi Mohamad-Nor
- L. Naveen
- Tunde Kovacs
- Wei Jiang
- Rohami Shafie
- David F. Larcker
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks (2017, positive): “With respect to corporate governance, Hwang and Kim (2008) shows that CEO compensation is higher in companies where directors are more socially connected to CEOs.”
- Cultural proximity and loan outcomes (2017, neutral): “[38] Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun and Seoyoung Kim, 2009, “It Pays to Have Friends,” Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1), pages 138-158.”
- CEO network centrality and merger performance (2015, background): “Fracassi and Tate (2012) and Hwang and Kim (2009) show that a CEO's social ties to board members reduce the effectiveness of board monitoring.”
- Co-opted Boards (2014, positive): “In general, our control variables are based on those in Adams and Ferreira (2009), Hwang and Kim (2009), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).”
- Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance (2012, background): “Although director interlocks have been found to reflect social ties (Hwang and Kim, 2011), we do not capture all possible avenues through which a director can obtain an information advantage such as golf club memberships, religious activities, political affiliations etc.”
- Corporate Governance and Audit Report Lag in Malaysia (2010, positive): “…emerging literature that examines whether independent directors who are without financial or familial ties to the management but who have social ties to management can effectively perform their fiduciary duty to monitor management on behalf of shareholders (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Hoitash, in press).”
- Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility (2015, neutral): “Taken together, the results suggest firms with better corporate governance are substantially more likely to provide compensation contracts linked to CSR. Examining the potential influence of greater managerial power, Table 5 reports results that support hypotheses H3a and H4a.”
- Board Connections and M&A Transactions (2012, neutral): “…Ishii and Xuan (2010), on the other hand, firms are classified as socially connected if 1 See, among others, Hallock (1997), Fich and White (2003), Hwang and Kim (2009), and Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2010) on the effect of director…”