Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mergers

By Roie Hauser. 2018

180 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3d0ff2375a7d545a8fb43be1bf2027d44ab2a09c

How researchers see this paper

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In Accounting

1. Angelica Gonzalez
2. Jens Hagendorff
3. Vathunyoo Sila
4. M. Malik

Citations in the corpus

• Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, background): “the reputation incentives of individual directors that result when mergers cause the termination of entire boards and independent directors lose one of their other directorships (Hauser, 2013).”
• Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions (2019, unknown): “Similarly, Hauser (2018) focuses on M&A deals that terminate the entire target board, and finds that this action increases the target’s profitability and Tobin’s Q, especially when monitoring is harder because directors are located far from the firm’s headquarters.”
• Big N Auditors and Audit Quality: New Evidence from Quasi-Experiments (2019, unknown): “1 For example, Hogan (1997), Ireland and Lennox (2002), and Weber and Willenborg (2003) apply the Heckman selfselection model.”