Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Taiwan

By Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsun-siou Lee, Tracie Woidtke. 2001

342 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b18ee12c7a3cef61d106d2f5ea35e6bd3be8e541

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Torsten M. Pieper
2. H. Hu
3. M. Tan
4. Lopin Kuo
5. Chwen-chi Liu
6. Tsung-Han Kuan
7. S. Chu
8. Jung-Hua Hung

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

1. Torsten M. Pieper
2. H. Hu
3. M. Tan
4. Pietro Mazzola
5. Lopin Kuo
6. Tsung-Han Kuan
7. S. Chu
8. Jung-Hua Hung

Citations in the corpus

• CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective (2006, background): “Generally, managers of Taiwanese corporations are usually related to the family of the controlling shareholder (Y. H. Yeh et al., 2001).”
• Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures: Evidence from an Emerging Economy (2012, neutral): “…by families; similar family dominance is reported other developing economies such as Turkey (Ararat and Ugur 2003), South Korea (Joh 2003), Taiwan (Yeh et al. 2001), Thailand (Wiwattanakantang 2002)], most companies in Bangladesh are either family-owned or controlled by substantial shareholders…”
• A Family Member or Professional Management? The Choice of a CEO and its Impact on Performance (2007, neutral): “The controlling family of a listed firm in Taiwan usually separates the voting rights from the cash-flow rights by using pyramid structures and/or cross shareholdings (Classens et al., 2000; Yeh et al., 2001).”
• Corporate governance and cash holdings: A quantile regression approach (2012, background): “Yeh et al. (2001) argue that the family-controlled shareholders may force the firm to adopt policies that fit their personal interests rather than those of the minority shareholders.”
• Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China (2009, background): “For instance, Yeh et al. (2001) discover that family representation on the board leads to centralization in authority and decision-making power, and a similar finding was also documented by Tong (1996).”