Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective

By Dan Sperber. 2000

337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad91c118d5775eb3329ef1f5ffea2f1724d48353

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Citations in the corpus

Relevance theory: A tutorial (2002, background): “…reasons, it is worth exploring the possibility that, within the overall mind-reading module, there has evolved a specialised sub-module dedicated to comprehension, with its own proprietary concepts and mechanisms (Sperber 1996, 2000, 2002; Origgi & Sperber 2000; Wilson 2000; Sperber & Wilson 2002).”
Natural Pragmatics and Natural Codes (2003, background): “One more point on terminology: the abilities that govern the attribution of mental states are now increasingly referred to as ‘metarepresentational’ abilities (see Sperber 2000).”
The Ontogenesis of Trust (2004, background): “The ability to conceptualize false beliefs emerges between 3 and 4 years (Perner, 1991; Sperber, 2000; Wellman, Cross and Watson, 2001; Whiten and Byrne 1991).”
How children learn the meanings of words (2000, background): “A different sort of objection, raised by Dan Sperber (1997), applies to the more general program of explaining early word learning in terms of theory of mind.”
To Trust or not to Trust? Children’s Social Epistemology (2010, background): “Secondly, children’s developing theory of mind does not enable them to exert a very sophisticated Machiavellian strategy (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Sperber 2000).”
Pragmatics, modularity and mindreading (2002, background): “All this makes it worth exploring the possibility that, within the overall ‘theory of mind’ module, there has evolved a specialised sub-module dedicated to comprehension, with its own proprietary concepts and mechanisms (Sperber 1996, 2000).”
Defining features versus incidental correlates of Type 1 and Type 2 processing (2012, methodology): “At a certain level of development, decoupling becomes used for so-called meta-representation—thinking about thinking itself (see Dennett 1984; Nichols and Stich 2003; Sperber 2000; Sterelny 2003).”
Pragmatic markers: the missing link between language and Theory of Mind (2020, background): “…on whether human language could have evolved without Theory of Mind, even though language acquisition starts years before children are able to pass standard false-belief tasks (Sperber 2000;Malle 2002;Levinson2006;Tomasello 2008;Scott-Phillips 2014; Woensdregt et al. 2020; Moore, under review).”
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation (2006, background): “Sperber, D. (2000). Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspec-”
Social learning and social cognition: The case for pedagogy (2006, background): “Thus, maybe somewhat paradoxically, this leads us to conclude that while teaching, at least in its initially selected form, does not necessarily require the ability to create metarepresentations of other individuals' representations (i.e., a theory of mind), it does, however, require the ability to…”
How to learn about teaching: An evolutionary framework for the study of teaching behavior in humans and other animals. (2014, background): “Meta-representation 1071 for the purposes of teaching means that the teacher holds representations of her own 1072 knowledge, which is itself in the form of representations (Sperber 2000).”
Relevance and prosody (2006, background): “In Section 5, we consider the relation between prosody, pragmatics and mindreading in the light of recent debates on pragmatics and modularity (Sperber 2000a,b; Bloom 2002; Wilson and Sperber 2002).1 1 For relevance-theoretic approaches to prosody, see e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: chapter 4,…”
Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation (2012, background): “More specifically it is argumentative, i.e., it is to enable individuals to argue with each other (Sperber, 2000, 2001).”
Intuitive and Reflective Inferences (2008, background): “We ground this distinction in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution.”
The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (2005, result): “Our claim for the distinction between the perceptual and cognitive levels for representing mental states is also consistent with other accounts of the hierarchical nature of representational systems (Sperber, 1997), including the significant role played by language at the metarepresentational level ”