The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

By Jonathan Evans. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2006

617 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c804f26277b42a3285cc88d9c2febac93439fb4

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Citations in the corpus

Why your stigma isn't hired : a dual-process framework of interview bias (2016, methodology): “Dual-process theories in reasoning (Evans, 2006), judgment and decision making (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), and social cognition (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), all propose that Type 1 processes are driven by cognitive scripts and heuristics.”
Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning (2012, background): “However, my recent reformulations of the heuristic-analytic theory (Evans, 2006 , 2007a ) broke this linkage.”
The complexity of developmental predictions from dual process models (2011, background): “As Evans (2006, 2008, 2009) notes, autonomouslevel processes that supply information to the analytic system are sometimes termed preattentive processes.”
Time for a Radical Reappraisal of Tourist Decision Making? Toward a New Conceptual Model (2016, background): “Dual-system theory has been described as the experiential and rational system (Pacini and Epstein 1999), reflexive and reflective system (Evans 2006), impulsive and reflective system (Strack and Deutsch 2004), and heuristic and systematic/analytic system (Lieberman 2003; Chaiken and Ledgerwood…”
The duality of mind: an historical perspective (2009, methodology): “Work of this kind led to the development of the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning (Evans 1989, 2006) and later to the dual-system theory discussed below.”
Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. (2008, methodology): “The processing assumptions of Kahneman & Frederick’s theory are similar to those of the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning (Evans 2006).”
Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective (2010, background): “” What does this mean, and how could this be reconciled with a dual process theory at the type level? I have argued recently that a number of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making have a structure that I describe as default-interventionist (eg, Evans, 1989 , 2006b ; Kahneman & ”
Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal- subpersonal distinction ∗ (2009, background): “This emphasis on the varied character of System 2 processes harmonizes well with recent work in dualprocess tradition (Buchtel and Norenzayan this volume; Evans 2006b, this volume; Stanovich this volume).”