Pragmatics, modularity and mindreading

By Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson. 2002

982 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Language and Linguistics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b89de74111eed66239088d02d4b3bcffe0fae984

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In Language and Linguistics

Citations in the corpus

Communication and Folk Psychology (2006, background): “Perhaps mindful of the developmental data, Sperber and Wilson (2002) suggest that an inferential mechanism which is geared to processing stimuli from communicative acts may feature as a module of the mind.”
Communicative mind-reading in preverbal infants (2018, background): “From the final sample of the Identical Signals condition an additional 11 infants were excluded due to fussiness (6), system crash (3) or experimenter error (2).”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “…from the demands imposed by maintaining a representation of the target agent’s beliefs while at the same time processing the questions of the experimenter; for we know that pragmatic components of speech comprehension occupy the resources of the mindreading faculty (Sperber and Wilson, 2002).”
Relevance and Goal-Focusing in Text Processing (2007, background): “The second principle is the communicative principle of relevance, which states that “every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own relevance” ( Sperber & Wilson, 2002, p. 17 ).”
Origins of human communication (2008, background): “Many authors have drawn attention to the appearance of communicative systems from a pragmatics point of view (e.g., Arbib, 2012; De Ruiter et al., 2010; Sperber & Origgi, 2010; Sperber & Wilson, 2002).”
Intuitive and Reflective Inferences (2008, background): “…the fall of objects and their other changes of location (Spelke, 1990), about the movement of animate and inanimate objects respectively (Leslie, 1995), and about the relevance of information unintentionally made available and that of information intentionally communicated (Sperber & Wilson, 2002).”
"Theory of mind" in schizophrenia: a review of the literature. (2005, background): “Clinical findings strongly suggest that patients with schizophrenia are impaired in social interaction relating to their reduced capacity to effectively engage in communication (e.g., Trognon 1992; Sperber and Wilson 2002).”
Relevance theory: A tutorial (2002, background): “5 For some suggestions about how this might be done, see Sperber & Wilson (1986a): 124-32.”
Relevance and prosody (2006, background): “(d) what light can prosody shed on the place of pragmatics in the architecture of the mind?”
Communication and miscommunication: The role of egocentric processes (2007, neutral): “Sperber and Wilson (2002) argued precisely that.”
The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (2005, background): “Alternatively, perhaps children achieve a mentalistic understanding of the appearance-reality distinction first in the context of language interpretation (see Happé & Loth, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 2002, for related claims; thanks to Peter Carruthers for suggesting this possibility).”
Recognizing Communicative Intentions in Infancy (2010, background): “These inferential processes might be implemented in specialized comprehension modules (Sperber and Wilson, 2002) or in more general mechanisms that are constrained by specific biases (such as the assumptions of referentiality and genericity).”
Complementary perspectives on metaphor: Cognitive linguistics and relevance theory. (2008, background): “For example, consider the following exchange between two university professors (Sperber and Wilson, 2002: 319): Peter: ‘‘Can we trust John to do as we tell him and defend the interests of the Linguistics department in the University Council?’’”