Interorganizational Familiness: How Family Firms Use Interlocking Directorates to Build Community–Level Social Capital 1
By Richard H. Lester, Albert A. Cannella. 2006
235 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a6cbfa960bfc25f2288aad4d9dd89b9b7ce6fbb7
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Thomas M. Zellweger
- Alfredo De Massis
- Marc van Essen
- Nadine H. Kammerlander
- James J. Chrisman
- P. Duran
- M. Carney
- Pietro Mazzola
In Management of Technology and Innovation
- Thomas M. Zellweger
- Marc van Essen
- Nadine H. Kammerlander
- Alfredo De Massis
- James J. Chrisman
- P. Duran
- Esra Memili
- H. Fang
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Alfredo De Massis
- Thomas M. Zellweger
- Marc van Essen
- Nadine H. Kammerlander
- James J. Chrisman
- P. Duran
- Pietro Mazzola
- M. Carney
Citations in the corpus
- Doing More with Less: Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms (2016, background): “…firms to building up and maintaining long-term and trust-based relationships with external stakeholders such as suppliers (Berrone et al., 2012; Berrone et al., 2010), particularly those that are also family firms (Lester & Cannella, 2006), and loyal customers (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).”
- Strategy, ownership, governance, and socio-psychological perspectives on family businesses from around the world (2012, background): “macro-level performance construct, Lester and Cannella (2006) describe how family firms use interlocking directorates to develop”
- The Resilient Family Firm: Stakeholder Outcomes and Institutional Effects (2015, background): “Emotional attachments tend to diminish opportunistic behavior as FCFs come to develop and value their social and reputational capital with key stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, and minority investors (Lester & Cannella, 2006).”
- National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, unknown): “The close interplay between family and inner-circle managers may lead to limited information disclosure to outside directors because ‘families tend to guard their privacy, and are very careful with whom they share confidential information’ (Lester & Cannella, 2006: 762).”
- The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, unknown): “…research on family firms has also suggested that owners and managers who extend the boundaries of their goals to include prosocial objectives may actually reap substantial economic benefits (Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Lester & Cannella, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).”
- Roots to Grow: Family Firms and Local Embeddedness in Rural and Urban Contexts (2018, background): “…with the external network of local stakeholders on the basis of informal and trust-based interactions (Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009; Lester & Cannella, 2006; Peake, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Muske, 2015) sustained by family members’ personal commitment and personalized business…”
- Does Size Matter? The Moderating Effects of Firm Size on the Employment of Nonfamily Managers in Privately Held Family SMEs (2016, background): “…overcome the inherent limitations of family management and improve effectiveness (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Ensley, 2006; Lester & Cannella, 2006; Martínez, Stöhr, & Quiroga, 2007), which is particularly important as the family firm gets bigger (Chittoor & Das, 2007;…”
- Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies (2011, background): “Moving from this premise, Lester and Cannella (2006) argue that family firms seek to mitigate these additional costs, that could induce strategic inertia, misalignment of interests and ineffective governance, by building and maintaining community-level social capital through board interlocks.”
- Markets, Hierarchies, and Families: Toward a Transaction Cost Theory of the Family Firm (2010, unknown): “More generally, Lester and Cannella (2006) note that family firms are likely to recruit onto their boards of directors executives from other family firms with whom they share common values.”
- Clarifying the strategic advantage of familiness: Unbundling its dimensions and highlighting its paradoxes (2010, background): “…to a bundle of idiosyncratic resources termed familiness (Habbershon and Williams 1999) which is widely accepted and used within the field (e.g. Lester and Cannella 2006; Pearson et al. 2008; Rutherford et al. 2008; Zellweger et al. 2008b) and helps differentiate family businesses from other…”
- How boards’ internal and external social capital interact to affect firm performance (2016, background): “…capital and firm performance independently, the corporate governance literature (Kim, 2005; Kim and Cannella, 2008; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Lester and Cannella, 2006) does not consider the possible impact of one on the other, or the potential influence of this interrelationship on firm…”