Markets, Hierarchies, and Families: Toward a Transaction Cost Theory of the Family Firm

By Eric Gedajlovic, M. Carney. 2010

263 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/966a5cd5e31c4ecd708322f254ff7292c14cb4f1

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Citations in the corpus

Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies (2014, background): “Consequently, researchers in management, economics, and finance have devoted and continue to devote great efforts to determining whether and how family firms may differ from non-family firms in resources, behavior, and performance (Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010; Gedajlovic et al. 2012).”
The Ability and Willingness Paradox in Family Firm Innovation (2015, background): “Family governance also often leads to idiosyncratic authority structures, incentives, and accountability norms (Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010) that can heavily influence innovation decision making and performance.”
Family firms in the global economy: Toward a deeper understanding of internationalization determinants, processes, and outcomes (2018, background): “Their particular characteristics, the strength of family involvement and emotional attachment to the firm, e.g., firm-specific human capital (Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010), patient capital and long-term orientation (De Massis et al., 2018), lower agency costs (Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2004; Miller…”
Tax aggressiveness in private family firms: An agency perspective (2014, background): “Private family firms have a much longer investment horizon and greater reputation concerns (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010) indicating that they do not only have financial goals.”
The relationship between innovation, knowledge, and performance in family and non-family firms: an analysis of SMEs (2013, background): “…of family firms, such as the differences in family involvement and the long-term orientation of family members, may affect many different aspects of the firm (Chrisman et al. 2010; Gedajlovic and Carney 2010; Ling and Kellermanns 2009; Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2006; Peng and Jiang 2010).”
A European empirical study of the relationship between firms’ intellectual capital, financial performance and market value (2017, unknown): “On the one hand, Gedajlovic and Carney (2010) argue that firms with ownership concentration are disadvantaged in value creation from IC.”
Stewardship Theory: Realism, Relevance, and Family Firm Governance (2019, background): “On the other hand, the lack of professionalization that typically accompanies an absence of control or coordination mechanisms is often considered a primary weakness of family firms (cf., Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010).”
Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese private SMEs (2012, unknown): “…to reduce agency costs, promotes the exchange of information and resources between family members and close associates within the organization, and may assist in enhancing their innovative capabilities internally (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Morck & Yeung, 2004; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008).”
Ownership of Corporations (2016, background): “Recent debates have examined family firms in TCE logic (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2010) and the advantages that BGs have from the internal capital market in dealing with uncertainty (e.g., Chang & Hong, 2000; Guillen, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997).”
The impact of small- and medium-sized family firms on economic growth (2015, background): “Recent research acknowledges that besides the direct effects caused by their inherent attributes, SMEs may also have indirect effects on economic growth due to competition and cooperation among SMEs or between SMEs and larger organizations (Audretsch 2007).”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, unknown): “…investment horizon (Boubakri et al. 2010; Burkart et al. 2003), cohesive management, length of tenure and depth of business expertise (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005), as well as unique assets and social capital and interorganizational agreements (Carney 2005; Gedajlovic and Carney 2010).”
Resilience of Family Firms: An Introduction (2011, background): “Family firms are thought to have advantages in the development of social capital (Pearson et al., 2008) as well as its use in combination with other firm-specific assets (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010).”