Web MIXes: A System for Anonymous and Unobservable Internet Access

By Oliver Berthold, Hannes Federrath, Stefan Köpsell. Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, 2000

472 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a259f359cdcc3950fc2b9c60acc693e44e51d338

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. George Danezis
2. Vitaly Shmatikov
3. Nick Mathewson
4. Roger Dingledine
5. Ming-Hsiu Wang
6. Steven J. Murdoch
7. B. Cohen
8. Len Sassaman

In Computer Networks and Communications

1. George Danezis
2. Vitaly Shmatikov
3. Nick Mathewson
4. Roger Dingledine
5. Ming-Hsiu Wang
6. Steven J. Murdoch
7. B. Cohen
8. Len Sassaman

Citations in the corpus

• An inquiry into money laundering tools in the Bitcoin ecosystem (2013, unknown): “ON/JonDo [30].”
• Statistical identification of encrypted Web browsing traffic (2002, background): “How do providers of anonymous services deal with their abuse [5] (for denial-of-service attacks, crime, or other undesired activity)? What is the right tradeo betw een anonymity and accountability?”
• The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval (2005, background): “Other network-level anonymity systems, such as Pipenet [18], Onion Routing [33], the Java Anon Proxy [7], or Tor [28], could be used in much the same fashion; unfortunately, they face the same barriers to widespread deployment [32].”
• Engineering Privacy (2009, background): “The first area includes research aimed at developing cryptographic privacy protections and systems with provable privacy guarantees (JAP [20], Tor [21], and work on differential privacy [22]).”
• Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol (2003, background): “Mix cascade research includes real-time mixes [18] and web mixes [4].”
• Dummy Traffic against Long Term Intersection Attacks (2002, background): “This is certainly true for batch MIXes and Web MIXes.”
• Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, background): “Many different architectures for mix networks have been proposed in literature [3,13,9,18,11].”
• Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks (2013, methodology): “The original design of the Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP) [4] infrastructure based anonymity network had clients exchange constant traffic with the first mix of a cascade, in order to defeat end-to-end traffic analysis.”
• Towards Measuring Anonymity (2002, result): “Therefore, in our model the degree of anonymity depends on the distribution of probabilities and not on the size of the anonymity set, in contrast with previous work [1, 2].”
• Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor (2005, background): “ISDN mixes [33] propose a design that allows phone conversations to be anonymised, and web-mixes [6] follow the same design patterns to anonymise web traffic.”
• Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure (2004, background): “Another class of anonymity designs aims to provide low-latency connections for web browsing and other interactive services [6, 9, 18, 28].”
• A privacy threat analysis framework: supporting the elicitation and fulfillment of privacy requirements (2011, unknown): “Anonymity system Mix-networks (1981) [37], DC-networks (1985) [38, 39], ISDN-mixes [40], Onion Routing (1996) [41], Crowds (1998) [42], Single proxy (90s) (Penet pseudonymous remailer (1993–1996), Anonymizer, SafeWeb), anonymous Remailer (Cipherpunk Type 0, Type 1 [43], Mixmaster Type 2 (1994) [44],”
• Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection (2002, background): “Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection Marc Rennhard Bernhard Plattner Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory Zurich,…”
• Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2004, unknown): “The Java Anon Proxy’s design calls for padding between end users and the head of the cascade [7].”
• Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks (2011, methodology): “The authors investigated recognition of 775 websites by many different anonymization techniques: OpenSSH, OpenVPN, Stunnel, Cisco IPsec-VPN as well as the onion routing based systems Tor [7] and JAP [2].”