Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor
By Steven J. Murdoch, George Danezis. 2005
675 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Dan Boneh
- Vitaly Shmatikov
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Prateek Mittal
- Bryan Ford
- George Danezis
- Nikita Borisov
- Ian Goldberg
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Vitaly Shmatikov
- Martin Vuagnoux
- Sylvain Pasini
- Andriy Panchenko
- Thomas Engel
- Andreas Zinnen
- Prateek Mittal
- Ming-Hsiu Wang
Citations in the corpus
- Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, background): “Prio protects against an adversary that can see and control the entire network, while Torbased schemes succumb to traffic-analysis attacks [94].”
- Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services (2015, background): “Most of the proposed attacks are based on side-channel leaks such as congestion [31, 17], throughput [30], and latency [21].”
- Dissent in Numbers: Making Strong Anonymity Scale (2012, neutral): “A state-controlled ISP, for example, who can monitor both a user’s “first-hop” link to Tor and the “last-hop” link from Tor to the user’s communication partner, can correlate packets to de-anonymize flows [43].”
- SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, background): “Anonymous networks such as Tor [31] are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks [45, 69].”
- Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, methodology): “Devastating timing attacks have been successfully demonstrated in real-world mix networks [19,23].”
- Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks (2013, background): “which Buddies does not attempt to address [18, 21, 28].”
- Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries (2013, background): “Quite simple and efficient techniques can correlate traffic at these separate locations by taking advantage of identifying traffic patterns [29].”
- This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Unobservable Communication over Fully Untrusted Infrastructure Unobservable Communication over Fully Untrusted Infrastructure (neutral): “This requirement is key to preventing many types of traffic analysis attacks [68] [96] [112].”
- Low-resource routing attacks against tor (2007, background): “Within Tor s routing model, an adversary could deploy a few nodes that have or appear to have high-bandwidth connections and high-uptimes.”
- Karaoke: Distributed Private Messaging Immune to Passive Traffic Analysis (2018, methodology): “This attacker model rules out systems based on Tor [7] such as Ricochet [3], due to traffic analysis attacks [5, 11, 18].”
- The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval (2005, background): “Attempts to address the practical barriers to deployment of low-latency anonymity systems have resulted in designs which are at greater risk to traffic analysis methods such as end-to-end timing attacks [21, 20, 49, 25] It is possible that such a low-latency system may be developed which is both sec”
- Locating hidden servers (2006, methodology): “In the experiments of [18], the corrupt server would send for between 10 and 25 seconds then stop sending for between 30 and 75 seconds.”
- Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-bayes classifier (2009, background): “…text mining Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.”
- ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies (2009, background): “Another attack relevant to P2P systems is the circuitclogging attack [1, 31], as McLahlan and Hopper [26] observed that, in P2P systems, this attack can reveal the true initiator.”
- Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network (2008, background): “Since its initial development, researchers have analyzed the system’s performance [2] and security properties [3,4,5,6,7].”