Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure

By Nick Mathewson, Roger Dingledine. 2004

212 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems

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Citations in the corpus

Riffle (2016, background): “A powerful adversary monitoring clients and network over longer periods of time can correlate the presence of some messages with the online status of the clients [35].”
Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “If an adversary can observe traffic patterns acrossmany epochs, as the set of online clients changes, the adversary c an make statistical inferences about which client is sending w hich stream of messages [25], [52], [57].”
Passive Data Link Layer 802.11 Wireless Device Driver Fingerprinting (2006, background): “While network security mechanisms such as encryption are often utilized to protect user privacy, traf fic analysis of encrypted traffic has proven successful in linking communication initiators and recipients participating in anonymous networking systems [23, 24].”
The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval (2005, methodology): “Although there are ways to use dummy traffic to resist statistical disclosure attacks, these are difficult to implement perfectly in practice (due to outages) and even slight imperfections render users vulnerable to attack [43].”
Stadium: A Distributed Metadata-Private Messaging System (2017, background): “In particular, user privacy depends on the number of other users in the system and their traffic patterns, and Tor was shown vulnerable to both passive [32] and active [26] attacks.”
Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks (2013, background): “tistical disclosure attacks [16, 37, 53].”
Vuvuzela: scalable private messaging resistant to traffic analysis (2015, unknown): “Adding cover traffic to try to obscure which pairs of users are communicating has been shown to be expensive and to yield only limited protection against a passive observer over time [3, 7], while adversaries that can actively disrupt traffic (e.”