Statistical identification of encrypted Web browsing traffic
By Qixiang Sun, Daniel R. Simon, Yi-Min Wang, Wilf Russell, V. Padmanabhan, Lili Qiu. Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2002
453 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e31f008318faaab9e42ddb22fb9510fb810fb306
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Vitaly Shmatikov
- Giuseppe Ateniese
- Dan Boneh
- Mihir Bellare
- Thomas Ristenpart
- Brent Waters
- Sriram Keelveedhi
- Rob Johnson
In Information Systems
- Giuseppe Ateniese
- Marc Najork
- Dennis Fetterly
- Mark S. Manasse
- Mihir Bellare
- Suman Sekhar Jana
- Vitaly Shmatikov
- Thomas Ristenpart
In Signal Processing
- Suman Sekhar Jana
- Marc Juárez
- Thomas Ristenpart
- Vitaly Shmatikov
- Claudia Díaz
- Andriy Panchenko
- Thomas Engel
- Rob Johnson
Citations in the corpus
- Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: A Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow (2010, background): “Sun et al's experiment showed that 100,000 web pages from a wide range of different sites could be effectively fingerprinted.”
- The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software (2012, background): “Side-channel attacks can extract information from encrypted traffic even when SSL is correctly deployed [4, 19].”
- A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks (2014, background): “tackled the more challenging problem of identifying individual pages within a set of websites [28] which led to Hintz’s attack on an anonymizing web proxy (SafeWeb) [12].”
- A large‐scale study of the evolution of Web pages (2003, background): “[13] conducted a study on the efficacy of web anonymizers.”
- No NAT'd User Left Behind: Fingerprinting Users behind NAT from NetFlow Records Alone (2014, background): “Ta rg et User and Host Profiling [22], [21] [34], [35], [32], [4], [16], [24] [36], [12] Traffic and Application Profiling [3], [25], [28] [37], [23], [15], [29] [6] Information Leaks [19], [30], [5], [33] Device Profiling [17], [11], [8]”
- Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks (2011, background): “[20] presented a fingerprinting attack that particularly targeted the deanonymization of users of an SSL encrypted connection to a proxy server.”
- Deep Fingerprinting: Undermining Website Fingerprinting Defenses with Deep Learning (2018, background): “Closed-vs Open-world Scenario: A closed-word assumes the user can only visit a small set of sites and that the adversary has samples to train on all of them [10, 16, 17, 35].”
- Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale (2016, background): “[23] proposed Jaccard’s coefficient as a metric for the similarity between observed and pre-collected traffic patterns, allowing websites with slightly varying sizes to be matched.”
- Separating agreement from execution for byzantine fault tolerant services (2003, background): “Techniques such as forwarding through intermediaries and padding messages can reduce a system’s vulnerability to traffic analysis [13], though forwarding can add significant latencies and significant message padding may be needed for confidentiality [46].”
- Automated Website Fingerprinting through Deep Learning (2017, background): “The first WF studies evaluated the effectiveness of the attack against HTTPS [8], encrypted web proxies [27], [16], OpenSSH [22] and VPNs [14] and it was not until 2009 that the first evaluation of a WF attack was performed in Tor [14].”
- Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006 (2006, methodology): “Randomised trapdoor hash functions have applications in provably strengthening the security of signature schemes [20], and constructing designated-verifier proofs/signature schemes [11, 21].”
- DupLESS: Server-Aided Encryption for Deduplicated Storage (2013, background): “We will not explicitly target resistance to traffic analysis attacks that abuse leakage of access patterns [48] or file lengths [24] [31] [40] [47] [59] [65] [72], though our system will be compatible with potential countermeasures.”
- Traffic Morphing: An Efficient Defense Against Statistical Traffic Analysis (2009, background): “The typical answer to these privacy concerns is to simply encrypt the data traversing the network in order to limit the information available to traffic analysis.”
- Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses (2012, background): “Several researchers have developed web page fingerprinting attacks on encrypted web traffic, as occurs when the victim uses HTTPS, link-level encryption, such as WPA, or an encrypting tunnel such as SSH, a VPN, or IPSec [2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 6].”