Dummy Traffic against Long Term Intersection Attacks

By Oliver Berthold, Heinrich Langos. 2002

147 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

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In Computer Networks and Communications

Citations in the corpus

Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, background): “The second attack is an intersection attack [20, 49, 83, 122].”
Vuvuzela: scalable private messaging resistant to traffic analysis (2015, unknown): “, fake traffic on each communication link [4, 20], or delaying messages [24].”
Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, background): “Berthold and Langos [4] also focus on high-latency networks, proposing that intermediate mixes inject dummy traffic to hide whether a connection is active or not.”
Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure (2004, background): “Berthold and Langos aim to increase the difficulty of intersection attacks with a scheme for preparing plausible dummy traffic and having other nodes send it on Alice’s behalf when she is offline [7], but their design has many practical problems.”
Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol (2003, methodology): “We briefly considered introducing cover-trash, dummy messages designed to look like tagged messages, to frustrate these tagging attacks; but that problem is as complex as the dummy traffic problem [5].”
Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks (2013, background): “tions to a constant rate with dummy traffic [4,6, 14,23] can slow—but not stop—passive intersection attacks [37].”
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments (2002, background): “Since the intersection of two different anonymity sets is likely to be smaller than either of the anonymity sets (due to the assumed regularity in behavior), different intersections of anonymity sets could be used to gain information about the targeted user (see for such an analysis e.g. [ 18 , 19])”
Locating hidden servers (2006, background): “While some dummy traffic schemes have been proposed [7, 17], that attempt to address some active attacks, no fielded low-latency systems currently use dummy traffic.”