Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol

By George Danezis, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. 2003

795 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems

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Citations in the corpus

Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin (2014, background): “Given that Zerocash transactions are not low latency themselves, Mixnets (e.g., Mixminion [33]) are also a viable way to add anonymity (and one that is not as vulnerable to trafﬁc analysis as Tor).”
Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, background): “Crowds [40], LAP [27], Mixminion [16], Tarzan [21], and Tor [18], provide anonymity in large networks, but these systems cannot protect against adversaries that observe traffic [4, 35] or perform active attacks [9] on a large fraction of network links.”
SybilInfer: Detecting Sybil Nodes using Social Networks (2009, background): “Practical systems like Mixmaster [17], Mixminion [5] and Tor [7] operate such a volunteer based anonymity infrastructure, that are very susceptible to Sybil attacks.”
Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, background): “Many different architectures for mix networks have been proposed in literature [3,13, 9 , 18,11].”
Dissent in Numbers: Making Strong Anonymity Scale (2012, neutral): “Mixminion [21] forwards E-mail through a series of relays, delaying and batching messages at each”
Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure (2004, methodology): “For example, only about one third of current Mixminion servers support delivery.)”
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types (2002, background): “But since [4] shows the feasibility of a freeroute network that securely protects against replays until a periodic key rotation event (after which the history can be forgotten), we think our assumption is reasonable; we will ignore replays and related issues for the rest of this paper.”
Privacy and Data Protection by Design - from policy to engineering (2014, background): “Such operational systems include mixmaster [146], and experimental systems providing support for replies have also been engineered and operated, such as mixminion [73].”
One (Block) Size Fits All: PIR and SPIR with Variable-Length Records via Multi-Block Queries (2013, background): “A good deal of modern cryptography focuses on the latter, with many cryptographic protocols relying on assumptions about it being infeasible — rather than impossible — for an adversary to extract some private information by observing or participating in a protocol run.”
Stadium: A Distributed Metadata-Private Messaging System (2017, background): “Systems based on these primitives [10, 17, 24, 25, 27, 31] share similar design principles of layering encryption, then batching, permuting, and forwarding messages.”
A capability-based security approach to manage access control in the Internet of Things (2013, methodology): “The specific Zero Knowledge Proof technique can vary from case to case (the FP7 IoT@Work project does not address privacy or anonymity issues being a project focused on the enacting manufacturing environments with IoT); as an example a possible technique could be for Bob to use a Mixminion anonymous”
Distributed Measurement with Private Set-Union Cardinality (2017, background): “Mixnets and shuffling schemes have found a variety of applications, particularly anonymous communication [8, 11, 39, 49] and electronic voting [4, 29, 40].”
Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format (2009, methodology): “systems [16], [8] have been proposed that further develop the idea of mixes.”
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2004, neutral): “All of these approaches limit exposure even when some selected users collude in the DoS.”
Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks (2013, background): “ate churn in the set of online users, and must support ongoing exchanges that make messages linkable over time, as with Mixminion nyms [15] or Tor sessions [18].”
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies (2009, background): “High-latency systems like Mixminion [10] and Mixmaster [30] are designed to be secure even against a powerful global passive adversary; however, the message transmission times for such systems are typically of the order of several hours.”
Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies (2016, background): “Thediscussion reminds of the early years of anonymous communication [Chaum 1981] and the subsequent research on mixing services [Danezis et al. 2003, M¨oller et al. 2003, Serjantov et al. 2002, Diaz and Serjantov 2003].”