Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
By Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Paul F. Syverson. 2004
2,262 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Privacy & Security
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Dan Boneh
- Srinath T. V. Setty
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- George Danezis
- Elaine Shi
- Abhradeep Thakurta
- Eli Ben-Sasson
- Neil Zhenqiang Gong
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Elaine Shi
- George Danezis
- Wenke Lee
- Dan Boneh
- Ian Goldberg
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Neil Zhenqiang Gong
- Prateek Mittal
In Privacy & Security
- Dan Boneh
- Abhradeep Thakurta
- Kunal Talwar
- Srinath T. V. Setty
- Vitaly Feldman
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Michael Walfish
- Shuang Song
Citations in the corpus
- Split learning for health: Distributed deep learning without sharing raw patient data (2018, methodology): “Tor [28] like configuration for multi-hop split learning: This configuration is an analogous extension of the vanilla configuration.”
- Amplification by Shuffling: From Local to Central Differential Privacy via Anonymity (2018, background): “To guarantee anonymity of reports, multiple mechanisms have been developed, Many, like Tor [DMS04], are based on the ideas of cryptographic onion routing or mixnets, often trading off latency to offer much stronger guarantees [vdHLZZ15 Central differential privacy.”
- Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin (2014, background): “The most obvious way to do this is via Tor [32].”
- Encode, Shuffle, Analyze Privacy Revisited: Formalizations and Empirical Evaluation (2020, background): “Similarly, multiple, disparate approaches have been developed for ensuring anonymity, including some comprehensive systems that have seen wide deployment [8].”
- Efficient Private Statistics with Succinct Sketches (2015, methodology): “The Tor network [28] needs to collect traffic statistics such as the number of, and traffic generated by, hidden services, in order to fine tune design decisions and convince their funders of the value of the network [32].”
- Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, background): “Crowds [40], LAP [27], Mixminion [16], Tarzan [21], and Tor [18], provide anonymity in large networks, but these systems cannot protect against adversaries that observe traffic [4, 35] or perform active attacks [9] on a large fraction of network links.”
- Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “The whistleblower could contact a reporter via Tor [28] or another low-latency anonymizing proxy [32, 54, 60, 72], but this would leave the leaker vulnerable to traffic-analysis attacks [4, 61, 62].”
- SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, background): “e approaches do not offer a file system abstraction with POSIX semantics. Unobservable communication. For message systems, hiding which users communicate is challenging. Anonymous networks such as Tor [32] are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks [46,72]. Dining Cryptographers (DC) networks [19,91,”
- Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks (2013, background): “Network anonymization services like Tor provide a higher degree of protection, because individual proxies cannot learn both the destination and client IP address of an anonymized flow [11].”
- PIR-Tor: Scalable Anonymous Communication Using Private Information Retrieval (2011, background): “Tor [10] is a deployed network for low-latency anonymous communication.”
- Private Similarity Computation in Distributed Systems: From Cryptography to Differential Privacy (2011, background): “Obviously, other implementations of the bidirectional anonymous channel are possible but they require non-trivial modifications of current anonymous communication networks [5, 26, 8] and are beyond the scope of this paper 6 .”
- Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale (2016, background): “In 2009, Herrmann et al. [11] were the first to apply website fingerprinting to the anonymization networks JAP [2] and Tor [8] as well as on OpenSSH, OpenVPN, Stunnel, and Cisco IPsec-VPN.”
- On the Computational Practicality of Private Information Retrieval (2006, background): “Experiments in Tor [29] (similarly in [23]) show anonymizer-induced latencies to be anywhere in the 0.”
- Characterization of Tor Traffic using Time based Features (2017, background): “Tor (Dingledine et al., 2004) is currently the most popular privacy enhancing tool.”
- PRIVE: anonymous location-based queries in distributed mobile systems (2007, methodology): “To obtain a pseudonym, any existing service for anonymous web surfing can be used 1 (e.g., onion routing [9]).”
- Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks (2011, methodology): “The authors investigated recognition of 775 websites by many different anonymization techniques: OpenSSH, OpenVPN, Stunnel, Cisco IPsec-VPN as well as the onion routing based systems Tor [7] and JAP [2].”
- Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure (2004, background): “Another class of anonymity designs aims to provide low-latency connections for web browsing and other interactive services [6, 9, 18 , 28].”
- Deanonymizing mobility traces: using social network as a side-channel (2012, background): “Side channels in the form of timing analysis [10] and power analysis [18] have been extensively studied in literature.”
- IoT SENTINEL: Automated Device-Type Identification for Security Enforcement in IoT (2016, positive): “Security Gateway can anonymously request the IoT Security Service through anonymization networks such as Tor [9] to ensure privacy preservation.”