The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

By J. Brosig, Joachim Weimann, Chun-Lei Yang. 2003

168 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/501457d09a9b2dbb75820bc891f95ef625264854

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In General Decision Sciences

1. Danila Serra
2. David J. Cooper
3. John H. Kagel
4. Malte Loos
5. Tibor Neugebauer
6. Javier Perote
7. Ulrich Schmidt
8. A. Barr

In Safety Research

1. Danila Serra
2. David J. Cooper
3. John H. Kagel
4. Kendra N. McLeish
5. Malte Loos
6. Tibor Neugebauer
7. Javier Perote
8. Ulrich Schmidt

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Danila Serra
2. Kendra N. McLeish
3. John H. Kagel
4. David J. Cooper
5. Ulrich Schmidt
6. A. Barr
7. Robert J. Oxoby
8. Stefan T. Trautmann

Citations in the corpus

• Corruption and culture: An Experimental Analysis (2010, methodology): “using different experimental designs, Cason and Mui (1998), Brandts and Charness”
• More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, unknown): “19 in economic experiments (see also Brandts and Charness, 2011) – relied on evidence from the ultimatum game (Brosig et al., 2003; McLeish and Oxoby, 2004).”
• Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior (2004, background): “Similarly, Brosig et al. (2003) find than second movers punish more in sequential bargaining games under the hot treatment than the cold treatment.”
• Other Regarding Preferences: A Selective Survey of Experimental Results (2012, methodology): “Brandts and Charness (2003) and Brosig, Weimann, and Yang (2003) both find that punishment rates for an unkind and/or deceptive act are significantly lower when the strategy method is used.”
• Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (2019, unknown): “(2001), and Brosig et al. (2003) report evidence that the strategy method may affect behavior.”
• The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons (2011, unknown): “For example, Brosig et al. (2003) suggest that a possible explanation for the difference between their results and those of Brandts and Charness (2000) is that in the latter paper each participant played the game twice, once as a first mover and once as a responder, rather than playing the game only…”
• Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2009, background): “Experimental evidence on different behavior in hot and cold experiments was reported by Brosig et al. (2003).”
• The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments (2012, unknown): “Each session of the main experiment lasted roughly 90 min; sessions in the one-shot experiment lasted about an hour.”
• The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment (2009, background): “While Guth et al. (2001), Schotter et al. (1994) and Brosig et al. (2003) find that strategy elicitation methods might induce significantly different behavior to natural elicitation methods, using different experimental designs, Cason and Mui (1998), Brandts and Charness (2000) and Oxoby and McLei”