The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards

By G. Z. Jin, Phillip Leslie. 2003

885 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Food Science, Marketing, Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/96ce3c7f28bdb11f1bfc55784a3347ba37fd491e

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Citations in the corpus

Saving Power to Conserve Your Reputation? The Effectiveness of Private versus Public Information (2012, positive): “In the corporate world, Jin et al., 2003 found that mandatory hygiene cards positively affected restaurant quality and health outcomes, while Delmas et al. (2009) found that mandatory disclosure over utility electricity generation fuel mix percentages resulted in an increase in cleaner fuels.”
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice (2010, background): “…al (2003); Figlio and Getzler (2006); Haney (2000); Hanushek and Raymond (2004); Hanushek and Raymond (2005); Jacob (2005); Jacob and Levitt (2003); Jin and Leslie (2003); Peterson and West (2003); Powers et al (2008); Lu (2009); Werner et al. (2005) Certifier bias, heterogeneity and competition…”
Information Disclosure Policies: Evidence from the Electricity Industry (2007, neutral): “In contrast, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that mandatory hygiene grade cards positively affectedrestaurantqualityandhealthoutcomes.”
Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants (2011, positive): “55 It would not be the first time that increasing the provision of information to consumers caused a supply-side response from restaurants—Jin and Leslie (2003) show that mandatory restaurant hygiene grade cards cause restaurants to improve hygiene quality.”
Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets (2014, background): “In contrast, our setting allows for supply-side responses both in prices and quality and among both public and 7 Three examples of non-experimental but related studies in similar market settings are Figlio and Lucas (2004), Mizala and Urquiola (2013), and Jin and Leslie (2003).”
Heterogeneous treatment effects and mechanisms in information-based environmental policies: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment (2013, background): “A growing empirical literature in economics and psychology suggests that such strategies can indeed affect policy-relevant behaviors (e.g., Bui and Mayer, 2003; Duflo and Saez, 2003; Jin and Leslie, 2003; Bjørner et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 2008; Bennear and Olmstead, 2008;”
To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office (2012, positive): “Restaurants can voluntarily post health department ratings even if they aren’t required to by law (Jin and Leslie, 2003).”
Persuasion: Empirical Evidence (2010, positive): “Jin & Leslie (2003) study the introduction of health scores for restaurants in the Los Angeles area.”
How Firms Respond to Being Rated (2010, background): “For example, restaurant grade cards based on health inspections seek not only to reduce health risks posed to consumers by unhygienic practices, but also to create stronger incentives for restaurant operators to maintain high standards of hygiene (Jin and Leslie, 2003).”
Eco-Labeling Strategies and Price-Premium (2014, positive): “The provision of information is often presented as an effective alternative to traditional environmental regulation (Delmas et al., 2009; Jin & Leslie, 2003; Kennedy, Laplante, & Maxwell, 1994; Khanna, Quimio, & Bojilova, 1998; Konar & Cohen, 1996; Weil, Fung, Graham, & Fagotto, 2006).”
Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene (2009, background): “However the fact remains, the introduction of restaurant hygiene grade cards in Los Angeles in 1998 had a large positive effect on hygiene quality (Jin and Leslie, 2003).”
Can Ratings Have Indirect Effects? Evidence from the Organizational Response to Peers’ Environmental Ratings (2015, background): “Even in a short timeframe, evidence of the profound impact of ratings systems has accumulated across empirical contexts such as restaurants (Jin and Leslie 2003; Luca 2011), universities (Espeland and Sauder 2007; Sauder and Espeland 2009), and public firms (Chatterji and Toffel 2010).”
The Economic Analysis of Advertising (2005, background): “Jin and Leslie (2003) offer striking evidence in support of this point.”
Reputation for Quality (2013, background): “In their reputation paper, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) consider a firm that sells a good of unknown quality.”