Yuliy Sannikov

Economics and Econometrics · 2005–2016

A researcher in the Science corpus: 8 papers; trusts 32 researchers and is trusted by 37 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 84 citations into it; #1,466 of 23,481 by trust here, #2,262 by citations
• Finance — 59 citations into it; #1,583 of 10,518 by trust here, #1,217 by citations
• Accounting — 46 citations into it; #5,778 of 8,970 by trust here, #6,779 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 13 citations into it; #1,250 of 11,946 by trust here, #3,825 by citations
• Strategy and Management — 8 citations into it

Whom Yuliy Sannikov trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Dilip Abreu
2. Susan Athey
3. Noah Williams
4. K. Bagwell
5. Peter M. DeMarzo
6. George J. Mailath
7. Ou-yang Hui
8. Enrique G. Mendoza
9. M. Gertler
10. Zhiguo He

Who trusts Yuliy Sannikov overall

1. Noah Williams
2. S. D. Tella
3. William Fuchs
4. Zhiguo He
5. E. Faingold
6. Bruno Biais
7. Alex Edmans
8. Michael R. Roberts
9. Bengt R. Holmstrom
10. Markus K. Brunnermeier

Papers from Yuliy Sannikov's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Yuliy Sannikov trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much
2. Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy
3. Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage
4. Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics
5. A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent
6. Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles (Journal of Political Economy)
7. Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts
8. Margin-Based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price
9. A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation
10. Intermediary Asset Pricing

Their papers

• Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey (2012) — 458 citations
• Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model (2006) — 650 citations
• The I Theory of Money (2016) — 264 citations
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent (2005) — 728 citations
• Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012) — 251 citations
• Reputation in Continuous‐Time Games (2011) — 70 citations
• Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production (2007) — 126 citations
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time (2007) — 153 citations