Physical Unclonable Functions for Device Authentication and Secret Key Generation
By G. Suh, Srini Devadas. 2007 44th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, 2007
2,563 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are innovative circuit primitives that extract secrets from physical characteristics of integrated circuits (ICs). We present PUF designs that exploit inherent delay characteristics of wires and transistors that differ from chip to chip, and describe how PUFs can enable low-cost authentication of individual ICs and generate volatile secret keys for cryptographic operations.
Subfields: Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Hardware and Architecture
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/852839104a55cbedffda3a6b8650c108ae2da4dd
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience
- Roel Maes
- Srini Devadas
- Ozgur Sinanoglu
- Jeyavijayan Rajendran
- Ramesh Karri
- Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu
- Patrick Schaumont
- Abhranil Maiti
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Patrick Schaumont
- Abhranil Maiti
- Ramesh Karri
- Roel Maes
- Farinaz Koushanfar
- Ozgur Sinanoglu
- Jeyavijayan Rajendran
- Srini Devadas
In Hardware and Architecture
- Roel Maes
- Patrick Schaumont
- Abhranil Maiti
- Srini Devadas
- Ramesh Karri
- Jeyavijayan Rajendran
- Ozgur Sinanoglu
- Farinaz Koushanfar
Citations in the corpus
- PUFKY: A Fully Functional PUF-Based Cryptographic Key Generator (2012, background): “Concerns about predictability and robustness led to the proposal of an improved ROPUF structure by Suh and Devadas [23], which uses a number of fixed oscillators and considers the relative frequencies of oscillator pairs instead of their absolute values.”
- Security analysis of integrated circuit camouflaging (2013, background): “Physical unclonable functions are leveraged to produce such IDs [37, 38].”
- Aegis: A Single-Chip Secure Processor (2007, methodology): “The RO PUF circuit has been tested on 15 Xilinx Virtex4 LX25 FPGAs (90nm) [16], where all FPGAs are exactly the same model and therefore identical designs.”
- Fault Analysis-Based Logic Encryption (2015, background): “Physical Unclonable functions are leveraged to produce such IDs [17]–[19].”
- Preventing IC Piracy Using Reconfigurable Logic Barriers (2010, background): “Chakraborty and Bhunia added a finite-state machine (FSM) to the netlist, with inputs connected directly to the primary inputs.(8) The FSM is initially locked and can be unlocked only with the correct sequence of primary inputs.”
- Physical unclonable functions (2020, methodology): “To avoid replay-based attacks, each CRP is used only once 10,11 .”
- A large scale characterization of RO-PUF (2010, background): “This is static for an RO, and assumed to be constant over time (we neglect ageing effect here).”
- Lightweight secure PUFs (2008, background): “I. INTRODUCTION Creation of security mechanisms and protocols is particularly challenging for embedded systems.”
- Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions (2010, methodology): “While [9] describes the use of Ring Oscillator PUFs in the context of Controlled PUFs and limited-count authentication, it is worth analyzing them as candidate Strong PUFs.”
- Physically Unclonable Functions (2012, methodology): “The ring oscillator PUF as proposed by Suh and Devadas [138].”
- Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain (2014, methodology): “In [63], [90], and [91], a delay PUF exploiting the random variations in delays of wires and gates on silicon was proposed.”
- A Systematic Method to Evaluate and Compare the Performance of Physical Unclonable Functions (2011, methodology): “For example, it should be able to compare a delay-based PUF like an RO PUF [20] with a memory-based PUF such as SRAM PUF [6].”
- Physical Unclonable Functions and Applications: A Tutorial (2014, methodology): “These efforts included xor arbiter PUFs, lightweight secure PUFs, and feedforward arbiter PUFs [8], [16], [17], [22], [39].”
- IoT: Internet of Threats? A Survey of Practical Security Vulnerabilities in Real IoT Devices (2019, background): “An example of weak PUF is the ring-oscillator described in [51].”
- Intel SGX Explained (2016, background): “, [175], [133], which generates a symmetric key that is used during the provisioning process.”