Aegis: A Single-Chip Secure Processor
By G. Suh, Charles W. O'Donnell, Srini Devadas. IEEE Design & Test of Computers, 2007
297 citations recorded by the source corpus.
In this article, we introduce a single-chip secure processor called Aegis. In addition to supporting mechanisms to authenticate the platform and software, our processor incorporates mechanisms to protect the integrity and privacy of applications from physical attacks as well as software attacks. Therefore, physically secure systems can be built using this processor. Two key primitives, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and off-chip memory protection, enable the physical security of our system. These primitives can also be easily applied to other secure computing systems to enhance their security.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2616f0a838f51110cf805e11f07057e92af87db3
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Sergey Gorbunov
- Farinaz Koushanfar
- Srini Devadas
- Ben Fisch
- Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy
- Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
- Dan Boneh
- Christoph Bösch
In Signal Processing
- Srini Devadas
- Dan Boneh
- Jorge Guajardo
- Sergey Gorbunov
- Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy
- Ben Fisch
- Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu
- Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Citations in the corpus
- Physical Unclonable Functions and Applications: A Tutorial (2014, methodology): “Suh suggested the use of Bose–Chaudhury– Hochquenghen (BCH) codes V more specifically the BCH (255,63, t ¼ 30) code [38].”
- IRON: Functional Encryption using Intel SGX (2017, methodology): “While we focus on implementing Iron with Intel SGX, in principle the system could be instantiated using other isolated execution environments that also support remote software attestation, such as XOM [40], AEGIS [55, 56], Bastion [16], Ascend [22] and Sanctum [21].”
- Efficient Helper Data Key Extractor on FPGAs (2008, background): “In both [12,13] the noisy nature of a PUF is acknowledged.”
- Secure and robust error correction for physical unclonable functions (2010, background): “PUFs have two broad classes of applications.(1,3-5) In certain classes of authentication applications, the silicon device is authenticated if the regenerated response is close enough in Hamming distance to the provisioned response.”
- Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain (2014, methodology): “A secure processor design using a PUF was shown in [93].”