Intel SGX Explained

By Victor Costan, Srini Devadas. 2016

2,189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Privacy & Security

Citations in the corpus

Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2019, methodology): “TEEs have been instantiated in many forms, including Intel’s SGX-enabled CPUs [208, 116], Arm’s TrustZone [2, 1], and Sanctum on RISC-V [117], each varying in its ability to systematically offer the above facilities.”
Privacy in Deep Learning: A Survey (2020, methodology): “TEEs have been deployed in many forms, including Intel’s SGX-enabled CPUs [126], Arm’s TrustZone [127].”
Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, background): “When a word is read from memory into a CPU register, a Memory Management Engine handles the decryption (Costan & Devadas, 2016).”
Practical Secure Aggregation for Federated Learning on User-Held Data (2016, background): “Relying only on the non-maliciousness of the bootstrapping round also constitutes minimization of trust: the code implementing this stage is small and could be publicly audited, outsourced to a trusted third party, or implemented via a trusted compute platform offering a remote attestation capabilit”
DÏoT: A Federated Self-learning Anomaly Detection System for IoT (2018, positive): “For instance, if Security Gateway supports a suitable trusted execution environment, like Intel SGX [10] or trusted platform module, its integrity can be remotely verified using remote attestation techniques [11].”
Foreshadow-NG: Breaking the virtual memory abstraction with transient out-of-order execution (2018, methodology): “performs an additional level of sanity checks after the legacy address translation process completed, to enforce strict access control for enclaves and to guard against direct address remapping attacks [2].”
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks (2017, background): “Previous work was mostly focused on attacks on enclaves from untrusted cloud operating systems [6], [9], [44]–[46].”
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX (2020, methodology): “As with most of SGX’s trusted computing base, complex key derivation functionality is implemented in microcode [14] and, according to an Intel patent [47], may leverage the processor’s native AES-NI instructions to accelerate some of the cryptographic operations.”
A Survey of Distributed Consensus Protocols for Blockchain Networks (2019, background): “The validity of remote attestation depends on the integrity of SGX implementation and the availability of IAS.”
Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses (2017, background): “Intel SGX is an x86 instruction-set extension for integrity and confidentiality of code and data in untrusted environments [19].”
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, background): “However, researchers have recently demonstrated two critical side-channel attacks against SGX programs, namely, page fault and cache-based side channels [10] [54] [65].”
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves (2017, background): “To address this problem, processor designers and vendors are now developing CPUs with hardware primitives, such as Intel SGX and MIT Sanctum, which isolate sensitive code and data within protected memory regions, called enclaves, that are inaccessible to other software running on the machine.”
Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts (2016, methodology): “We use the generic term attestation to refer to a quote, and denote it by att .”
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, methodology): “Intel SGX [9] is one of the existing implementations of hardwarebased TEE that has been shipped with Intel CPU since Skylake.”
DarkneTZ: towards model privacy at the edge using trusted execution environments (2020, background): “s such as unchangeable private keys or secure bits during manufacturing, which helps ensure that untrusted parts of the platform (even privileged OS or hypervisor processes) cannot access TEE content [7, 10]. In addition to strong security guarantees, TEEs also provide better computational performan”
SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution (2017, neutral): “Intel SGX is a set of ISA extensions for trusted computing released with recent Intel processors [33, 53].”
Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) Support for Dynamic Memory Management Inside an Enclave (2016, methodology): “The hardware must protect enclave software from attacks as described in [5] and [6].”
Applications of Blockchains in the Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey (2019, background): “Nodes in the Sawtooth blockchain network request for a wait time from a trusted function within the SGX.”
Cheetah: Optimizing and Accelerating Homomorphic Encryption for Private Inference (2020, methodology): “Implementation-based methods include (i) moving computation to edge devices, i.e., local computation [56], [73], and (ii) trusted execution environments (TEEs), e.g., SGX [10], [15], [62].”
Privacy-Preserving Inference in Machine Learning Services Using Trusted Execution Environments (2019, background): “Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions), ARM TrustZone [6], [17] enable execution of programs in secure hardware enclaves.”