Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs ?

By Sunny Shin, R. El-Diwany, S. Schaffert, Erin J. Adams, K. Garcia, Pablo Pereira, Y. Chien. 2005

Subfields: Cognitive Science & Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Neural Theory-of-Mind? On the Limits of Social Intelligence in Large LMs (2022, background): “On the other hand, some argue that language develops after T O M since preverbal infants already could possess some level of T O M-like abilities (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate and Vernetti, 2014; Poulin-Dubois and Yott, 2018).”
What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition (2008, background): “Although very recent evidence from Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) suggests that 15-month-old infants can represent an agent ’ s false beliefs, it seems that much younger infants can represent an agent ’ s goal or (motor) intention.”
A new look at infant pointing. (2007, background): “Infants by 12 – 15 months of age can determine what others ''know'' (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003) Infants by 12 – 14 months of age know what they have and have not mutually experienced with another person in episodes of joint attention: what they know together (Moll &…”
Psychological and Sociomoral Reasoning in Infancy (2014, background): “The first experiment to examine whether infants could attribute a false belief to an agent, using a non-elicited-response task, was conducted by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005).”
Probing the depth of infants’ theory of mind: Disunity in performance across paradigms (2017, methodology): “This paradigm was successfully adapted to test false belief by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) who demonstrated that 15- month- old infants looked significantly longer at an incongruent test trial, where an actor’s actions were inconsistent with her false belief (searching for an object at the…”
Pragmatic markers: the missing link between language and Theory of Mind (2020, background): “This also means that the present account does not hinge on the ongoing debate in the Theory of Mind literature about whether the concept of belief is innate or develops during childhood (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Heyes 2014).”
How (not) to measure infant Theory of Mind: Testing the replicability and validity of four non-verbal measures (2018, methodology): “One study (Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016) tested infants in a VoE FB task (conceptually after Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) and in other implicit tasks of their understanding of desires and intentions.”
The Role of Language in Theory of Mind Development. (2014, background): “Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) asked whether 15-month-old infants would stare longer at a scene in which the equivalent of “Sally” in the classic task searched in the place where the object really was.”
Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science (2008, methodology): “[164] use data from habituation of looking in infants of only nine months to argue for the beginnings of effective reasoning about false beliefs at this age.”
Nurturing Nature: How Brain Development Is Inherently Social and Emotional, and What This Means for Education (2019, background): “They learn to act alone and with others ’ help to satisfy their curiosities and achieve their goals (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992).”
Theories of cognitive development: From Piaget to today (2015, background): “…note that, among these framework theories, some are manifest cross-culturally and early in infant development, something that seems to be the case for theory of mind (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), which is assumed to constitute an example of the evolved cognitive mechanisms discussed by Bjorklund.”
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds (2007, methodology): “However, some researchers (e.g., Leslie, 1994, 2005) have advocated an earlydeveloping theory-of-mind mechanism, and recently Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) have reported striking results suggesting that 15-month-old infants may attribute false beliefs to other individuals.”
Including Deontic Reasoning as Fundamental to Theory of Mind (2008, background): “Research on infants’ understanding of persons increasingly shows early understanding of persons’ intentional, mental states [Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003] in looking-time and in action-interactive paradigms.”
Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief (2005, unknown): “Many authors have reported that performance on this task undergoes a developmental transition in the third or fourth year of life, from below-chance to above-chance performance (see Wellman et al. (2001) for a review and meta-analysis, though see also Onishi and Baillargeon (2005)).”
Linguistic cues facilitate children’s understanding of belief-reporting sentences (2021, background): “…while more recent research using spontaneous non-verbal tasks found that infants in their second year of life can already reason about others’ false beliefs (e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Song et al., 2008; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007; for a review, see Baillargeon et al., 2010).”
What's worth the effort: Ten-month-old infants infer the value of goals from the costs of actions (2017, unknown): “…assumptions about the physical properties (Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2006), intentions and goals (Woodward, 1998), mental states (Luo & Johnson, 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), and causal powers (Muentener & Carey, 2010) of agents, as well as the cost associated with their actions (Gergely &…”