Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief

By Noah D. Goodman, Chris L. Baker, Vikash K. Mansinghka, Alison Gopnik, Henry Wellman, Laura Schulz, Josh Tenenbaum. 2005

123 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d227a4a3cf06affc234b82eb353a8f92f10e7abb

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Citations in the corpus

Concepts in a Probabilistic Language of Thought (2014, background): “Starting around ten years ago, several authors began to consider Bayesian networks as formal models for intuitive theories (Goodman et al., 2006; Gopnik et al., 2004; Rehder, 2003; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2003), focusing on their causal aspects.”
The Child as Econometrician: A Rational Model of Preference Understanding in Children (2014, unknown): “, [4,5]), the model is based on the idea”
Action understanding as inverse planning. (2009, background): “1c sketches a more general intuitive theory of rational action, intended to capture various qualitative proposals in the theory of mind literature ( e.g. Bartsch & Wellman (1995), Wellman & Bartsch (1988), Wellman (1990); see also Goodman et al. (2006) for a related formal account).”
Reconstructing constructivism: Causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms and the theory theory (2012, unknown): “In fact, Goodman et al. (2006) proposed a Bayesian model of theory-of-mind learning that captures the characteristic changes in children’s understanding.”
Intuitive Theories (2020, background): “In recent years, a number of accounts have been proposed that conceptualize people's inferences about an agent's goals or preferences in terms of an inverse decision-making approach (Baker et al., 2009; Goodman et al., 2006; Lucas, Griffiths, Xu, & Fawcett, 2009; Yoshida, Dolan, & Friston, 2008).”
A constructivist connectionist model of transitions on false-belief tasks. (2013, unknown): “Overwalle, 2010;Wahl & Spada, 2000), selected from a highly limited set of potential transitions (Goodman et al., 2006), or had transitions thatwere implemented throughdirectmanipulationof particular parameter values (O’Loughlin & Thagard,”
Bayesian Theory of Mind: Modeling Joint Belief-Desire Attribution (2011, background): “Goodman et al. (2006) model how belief and desire inferences interact in the classic " false belief " task used to assess ToM reasoning in children (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).”
Explanation and Abductive Inference (2012, background): “explanation (for related distinctions see Goodman et al., 2006; Railton, 1981).”
The Social Bayesian Brain: Does Mentalizing Make a Difference When We Learn? (2014, background): “beliefs about beliefs), it would still require some modification to capture the difference between people who pass and people who fail the false belief test [53] (but see [54]).”
A decision network account of reasoning about other people's choices. (2015, background): “…2013; Hedden & Zhang, 2002; Oztop, Wolpert, & Kawato, 2005; Shultz, 1988; Van Overwalle, 2010; Wahl & Spada, 2000), and some of these accounts rely on Bayes nets (Goodman et al., 2006; Hagmayer & Osman, 2012; Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006; Sloman, Fernbach, & Ewing, 2012).”