Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
By Victoria Southgate, Atsushi Senju, Gergely Csibra. 2007
899 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Peter Carruthers
- Pierre Jacob
- Stephen A. Butterfill
- J. de Villiers
- Hannes Rakoczy
- Baudouin Forgeot d’Arc
- Saurabh Gupta
- Barbara J. Sahakian
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Peter Carruthers
- Peng Zhou
- Xiaowen Zhang
- Hannes Rakoczy
- J. de Villiers
- Andrew N. Meltzoff
- P. A. Villiers
- Pierre Jacob
In Social Psychology
- Peter Carruthers
- Henrike Moll
- Pierre Jacob
- J. de Villiers
- Peng Zhou
- Lin Bian
- Shannon Spaulding
- Stephen A. Butterfill
Citations in the corpus
- Machine Theory of Mind (2018, background): “An understanding of this last possibility – that others can have false beliefs – has become the most celebrated indicator of a rich Theory of Mind, and there has been considerable research into how much children, infants, apes, and other species carry this capability (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; South”
- Belief attribution despite verbal interference (2011, background): “Belief attribution despite verbal interference Baudouin Forgeot d’Arc1,2, and Franck Ramus1 1Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, EHESS, CNRS, DEC/ENS, Paris, France 2Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Unit, Robert Debré Hospital, APHP, Paris, France False-belief (FB) tasks have…”
- The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: a Critique (2011, methodology): “Using an eye-tracker to measure infants’ looking behavior, Southgate et al. (2007) coded the location of the first saccade following the illumination of the windows.”
- Linguistic cues facilitate children’s understanding of belief-reporting sentences (2021, background): “…while more recent research using spontaneous non-verbal tasks found that infants in their second year of life can already reason about others’ false beliefs (e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Song et al., 2008; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007; for a review, see Baillargeon et al., 2010).”
- Psychological Reasoning in Infancy. (2016, background): “In believed an object was in location-A (when it was in fact in location-B or had been removed from the scene) would search location-A for the object (e.g., Meristo et al. 2012; Senju et al. 2011; Southgate et al. 2007; Surian & Geraci 2012).”
- Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind" (2013, background): “One-year-old children also predict actions of agents with false beliefs about the locations of objects (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Southgate et al. 2007) and choose different ways of in-”
- Two Systems for Mindreading? (2016, background): “…between the ages of 6 and 18 months are capable of representing and reasoning about the false beliefs of other agents (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Southgate et al. 2007; Surian et al. 2007; Song et al. 2008; Buttelmann et al. 2009; Poulin-Dubois and Chow 2009; Scott and Baillargeon 2009; Kovács…”
- Testing theory of mind in large language models and humans (2024, methodology): “…tasks have been developed to study it, including indirect measures of belief attribution using reaction times 4–6 and looking or searching behaviour 7–9 , tasks examining the ability to infer mental states from photographs of eyes 10 , and language-based tasks assessing false belief understanding…”