Including Deontic Reasoning as Fundamental to Theory of Mind

By Henry Wellman, Joan G. Miller. Human Development, 2008

93 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f3dec3998769d6e20a3863e2a577158930c4b402

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. David Tannenbaum
2. David A Pizarro
3. B. Korkmaz

In Social Psychology

1. David Tannenbaum
2. David A Pizarro
3. B. Korkmaz

In Sociology and Political Science

1. David Tannenbaum
2. David A Pizarro
3. B. Korkmaz

Citations in the corpus

• Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. (2010, unknown): “However, the Rational Scientist view also emphasizes a role for information about norms in prediction and explanation (see also Kalish, 2006; Wellman & Miller, 2006, 2008).”
• Theory of Mind and Neurodevelopmental Disorders of Childhood (2011, background): “Feeling trust is dependent on the functional significance of ToM activity (1).”
• Bringing character back: How the motivation to evaluate character influences judgments of moral blame. (2012, background): “In a similar vein, Wellman and Miller (2008) have argued that deontic considerations (judgments of permissibility or obligation) are fundamental to reasoning about intentionality (or belief-desire reasoning, which is usually thought to be a core component of intentionality; see Malle & Knobe, 1997).”