Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions

By K. Farrell, David A. Whidbee. 2003

424 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8244a93cb62bd7a03b5729f6eac8135dafc5e5f3

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Citations in the corpus

Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections (2009, background): “7 See, for example, Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1989), Parrino (1997), DeFond and Park (1999), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Goyal and Park (2002), Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2003), Farrell and Whidbee (2003) and Balsam and Miharjo (2007).”
Performance-Induced CEO Turnover (2020, methodology): “20 The Parrino algorithm has been used by, among others, Parrino (1997), Farrell and Whidbee (2000, 2003), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Yermack (2006), Lel and Miller (2008), Brookman and…”
A Bibliometric Analysis (2005, neutral): “See Farrell and Whidbee (2003).”
Risk and CEO turnover (2010, background): “Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2003) study the properties of accounting information and CEO turnover, and Farrell and Whidbee (2003) examine performance expectations and CEO turnover.”
Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance* (2008, neutral): “…meet or beat earnings benchmarks (unwarranted by the firm’s underlying economic performance) in order to temporarily boost stock price, exercise his options, safeguard his bonus (Matsunaga and Park 2001, Bartov and Mohanram 2003) or his job (Matsunaga and Park 2002; Farrell and Whidbee 2003).”
CEO tenure and the performance-turnover relation (2014, neutral): “For example, prior research indicates that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively related to annual earnings decreases (Weisbach 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993) and to negative analyst annual earnings forecast errors (Farrell and Whidbee 2003).”
CEO Turnover and Properties of Accounting Information (2003, neutral): “Puffer and Weintrop (1991) and Farrell and Whidbee (2002), for example, argue that the deviation of realized earnings from expected earnings may provide additional information about how CEO performance deviates from board expectations.”
CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality (2008, neutral): “Park [2001] provide evidence that missing targets is linked to lower cash compensation, and Farrell and Whidbee [2003] show higher rates of job dismissal for managers who fail to meet analysts’ earnings targets. Finally, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal [2004] find that surveyed CFOs think that meeting o”